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ABSTRACT 
MANAGED CARE ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: 
TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
Willis Chou 
This thesis examines the law of medical malpractice in 
light of managed care, and argues that the traditional 
physician-centered model of malpractice liability is 
incompatible with the cost reforms of managed care. Managed 
care organizations employ a host of strategies to reduce or 
contain medical costs, many of which invariably have 
clinical consequences. Physicians are no longer autonomous 
with respect to medical decision making, yet they remain the 
primary targets in malpractice litigation. A potentially 
superior alternative to the current tort system is managed 
care enterprise liability, where the risk of malpractice 
would be borne exclusively by the integrated health care 
enterprise. 
After tracing the origins of enterprise liability from 
products liability law, this thesis argues for its 
applicability in the health care context. First, theories 
of managed care liability are examined in order to establish 
a legal basis for enterprise liability. Next, enterprise 
liability is supported from a public policy perspective, 
because it best reconciles the normative goals of a 
liability system (compensation of victims, prevention of 
injuries, promotion of quality care, and reduction of 
administrative expenses) with cost reform. 
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President Clinton's controversial Health Security Act 
of 1993 (the "Clinton Plan")1 underscored the growing 
concern for comprehensive health care reform in the United 
States.2 This concern has largely arisen from a perceived 
two-part "crisis" in health care. The first is a crisis of 
spiraling medical costs,3 coupled with a lack of adequate 
insurance coverage for many. These two events are causally 
related. Rising health care costs have imposed an 
increasing burden on employers and governments,4 which have 
1 Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
The Act was the product of nine months of research and drafting by the 
Health Care Task Force headed by Hillary R. Clinton, and featured the 
concept of "managed competition" to provide cost-effective medical care. 
2 For an excellent discussion of the policy issues that need to be 
addressed by health care reform, see James F. Blumstein, Health Care 
Reform: The Policy Context, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 15 (1994); Robert J. 
Blendon et al., Making the Critical Choices, 261 JAMA 2509 (1992). 
3 In 1993, Americans spent roughly $3900 per person on health care, for 
a total of $942.5 billion. International Trade Admin., U.S. Dep't of 
Commerce, U.S. Industrial Outlook 1994, at 42-2 (1994) . Over the past 
forty years, spending for health care has grown 3% per annum faster than 
expenditures for all other goods and services. It now accounts for 
approximately 14% of the GNP. If the current rate of growth continues, 
health care spending would represent almost one-third of the GNP by the 
year 2030. See Victor R. Fuchs, No Pain, No Gain: Perspectives on Cost 
Containment, 269 JAMA 631 (1993); Henry J. Aaron, Serious and Unstable 
Condition: Financing America's Health Care (1991). 
4 Corporate employers complain that rising health care costs place them 
at a competitive disadvantage in the international marketplace. See 
Kenneth R. Wing, American Health Policy in the 1980's, 36 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 608, 672-75 (1986). Meanwhile, the health care entitlement 
programs of Medicare and Medicaid continue to consume an ever-greater 
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been the traditional sources of health care insurance.* * 5 As 
employers have dropped or limited insurance to reduce their 
costs, an ever-growing number of Americans have become 
uninsured.6 
The second crisis concerns the state of medical 
malpractice. Malpractice insurance premiums skyrocketed 
from $60 million in 1960 to more than $7 billion by 1990,7 
prompting unprecedented physician walkouts and an uproar for 
state tort law reform.8 A great deal of dissatisfaction has 
been voiced by all the relevant parties - physicians, 
portion of the federal budget. See Board of Trustees Report, A Proposal 
for Financing Health Care of the Elderly, 256 JAMA 3379 (1986). 
5 Because the United States has never adopted a national health 
insurance program, a dual system of public and private third-party 
insurance gradually developed to help patients cover the costs of 
illness. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 
235-334 (1982). 
6 Approximately 85% of the population is currently covered by some sort 
of health insurance plan, usually employer or government provided. Yet 
an estimated thirty-five to forty million Americans lack insurance 
coverage at any one time. See Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From 
Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA 2491 (1991). 
7 Paul C. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial 2 (1991) . 
8 In 1975, doctors throughout much of California staged a month-long 
protest strike against rising insurance rates. See Henry Weinstein, 
N.Y. Times, May 29, 1975, at 1, col. 4. Waves of legislative activity 
addressing tort and insurance reform took place in 1975-76 and again in 
1985-86. See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical 
Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 499 (1989); Glen O. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice 
Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5 
(Spring 1986). See also infra notes 131-143 and accompanying text. 
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patients, insurers and attorneys - with respect to the 
overall process by which the legal system assigns liability, 
as well as compensates the victims of injuries. 
Physicians experience enormous economic and emotional 
costs, and feel the need to practice medicine defensively. 
Injured patients complain that the current tort system is an 
unfair and unpredictable lottery that can take years to 
achieve resolution. Insurance companies note that increased 
loss ratios and restrictive state regulation have made 
insurance underwriting burdensome and unprofitable. In the 
face of such difficult and expensive litigation, malpractice 
attorneys hesitate to accept any but the most attractive 
10 
cases. 
The Clinton Plan attempted to address both the cost and 
malpractice crises. To control medical costs and provide 
greater health care access, the Clinton Plan proposed a 
three-tier hierarchy of organizations to regulate and 
The total costs of medical professional liability were estimated to be 
$12-13 billion in 1984. These costs include liability insurance 
premiums and the indirect costs of defensive medicine (tests and 
procedures done to minimize the threat of litigation). Roger A. 
Reynolds et al. , The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA 
2776 (1987) . 
10 See Larry M. Pollack, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance (MMI): A First- 
Party, No-Fault Insurance Proposal for Resolving the Medical Malpractice 
Controversy, 23 Tort & Ins. L.J. 552, 552 (1988). 
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provide health care services. This hierarchy combined 
sweeping government regulation with private market 
initiatives. The first two tiers contemplated governmental 
control in the forms of a National Health Board and Health 
Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives ("HIPCs").11 The third 
tier was to be represented by Managed Care Organizations 
("MCOs") - integrated health plans consisting of physicians, 
hospitals, and insurance companies.12 
While a bold approach was taken toward the cost crisis, 
the Clinton Plan addressed the malpractice crisis in a more 
understated manner. Early reports suggested that the 
Clinton Plan would embrace the innovative theory of 
"enterprise liability."13 Under enterprise liability, the 
The National Health Board would have overseen the entire system, 
setting broad guidelines and determining a global budget. HIPCs, or 
"health alliances", would have functioned as quasi-governmental 
organizations created by the states to oversee the process by which 
private health plans offer medical coverage. By pooling large numbers 
of subscribers, HIPCs would have obtained greater bargaining power. For 
a complete description of the organizations proposed under the Clinton 
Plan, see the text of the Health Security Act, supra note 1. 
12 The strategy of managed competition was at the heart of the Clinton 
Plan, which also included cost-sharing requirements (deductibles, 
coinsurance and copayments) and caps on premium increases. See Walter 
A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, 
Health Affairs, Spring 1994, at 9. 
13 In June 1993, Task Force member Robert Berenson, M.D., publicly 
discussed the enterprise liability theory with respect to the Clinton 
Plan. Currents, Hosp. & Health Networks, Aug. 5, 1993, at 23. See also 
Mark Crane, The Malpractice Reform Idea that Won't Go Away, Med. Econ., 
July 26, 1993, at 27; Robert Pear, Changing Health Care: Clinton 
Advisers Outline Big Shift for Malpractice, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1993, at 
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locus of liability for medical malpractice would shift from 
the individual physician to the provider organization.14 
Instead of readily endorsing enterprise liability, many 
physicians sharply criticized its inclusion in the Clinton 
Plan.15 Enterprise liability was objected to on the grounds 
that it would cause MCOs to demand greater control over 
medical decision making, further reducing physician 
autonomy.16 In response to this unexpected opposition, the 
final version of the Clinton Plan did not mandate enterprise 
Al; Sara Fritz & David Savage, Health Reform Plan May Exempt Doctors 
from Suits, L.A. Times, May 5, 1993, at Al. 
14 These organizations might include hospitals and hospital alliance 
systems, as well as forms of MCOs responsible for financing and 
providing care to a defined patient population. See William M. Sage et 
al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care 
Quality Improvement, 20 Am. J.L. & Med. 1 (1994) (comprehensively 
discussing enterprise liability and its potential effect on the quality 
of health care). 
15 The American Medical Association and Physician Insurer Association of 
America (PIAA) flexed their collective lobbying might to discourage the 
adoption of enterprise liability. See, e.g., Brian McCormick, 
Enterprise Liability Out, Am. Med. News, June 28, 19 93, at 1; David 
Rogers, Initial Clinton Medical Malpractice Reform Plan Pulled After 
Resistance by Entrenched Interests, Wall St. J., June 15, 1993, at A20. 
16 There were other objections as well. The PIAA, a trade association 
of physician-owned insurance companies, saw enterprise liability as a 
threat to its relevance. The AMA objected because it favored 
alternative state tort reforms, such as caps on jury awards and 




liability, but instead merely offered federal funds to 
states wishing to establish "demonstration projects."17 
Despite ultimately failing in Congress, the Clinton 
Plan's central theme - the widespread adoption of integrated 
health plans - has been usurped by the private 
marketplace.18 Startling changes in the health care market 
have occurred in the past decade: a series of mergers and 
acquisitions in the hospital and pharmaceutical industries; 
an increased presence of for-profit corporations in the 
hospital sector; a greater willingness of employers and 
other large purchasers to negotiate directly with providers 
and insurers to control health costs; and, most importantly, 
the growth of managed care.19 
The term "managed care" is not monolithic; rather, it 
encompasses a continuum of possible organizational 
structures. In this paper, MCO is intended as an umbrella 
See Health Security Act, supra note 1, at§ 5311. The demonstration 
projects would have served as experiments to determine whether 
enterprise liability could improve quality, reduce defensive medicine, 
and allow for better risk management. 
18 
See Erik Eckholm, While Congress Remains Silent, Health Care 
Transforms Itself, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1994,§ 1, at 1. For a criticism 
of health care being increasingly subject to the ethics of the 
marketplace, see Jerome P. Kassirer, Managed Care and the Morality of 
the Marketplace, 333 New Eng. J. Med. 50 (1995) . 
19 See generally Keith M. Korenchuk, Transforming the Delivery of Health 
Care: The Integration Process (1994). 
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term referring to the range of these entities. An MCO is 
perhaps best conceptualized as a union, in varying degrees, 
of the financing (or payor) function with that of the 
delivery (or provider) function. MCOs negotiate with both 
providers (physicians and hospitals) and subscribers (groups 
of patients) to deliver health care for a fixed amount of 
payment on a per-capita basis. This consolidated approach 
stands in contrast to traditional "fee-for-service" 
medicine.20 
Although MCOs can assume a variety of forms, they share 
certain general characteristics. Common to all forms is an 
attempt to control costs by modifying the manner in which 
health care resources are utilized. MCOs employ a host of 
strategies to provide cost-effective care, including 
capitation, utilization review, practice guidelines, 
financial incentive systems, and the use of gatekeepers.21 
These methods of cost control have altered the physician- 
patient relationship in two critical ways. 
Under fee-for-service, physicians and hospitals are paid a separate 
amount for each service rendered. This is the financial arrangement 
seen in traditional indemnity and service-benefit plans. See Starr, 
supra note 5, at 63, 291-92. 
21 See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text for a more complete 
discussion of these cost-containment strategies. 
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First, through utilization review, practice guidelines 
and the use of gatekeepers, the MCO achieves the ability to 
direct the means and methods of providing health care 
services. Second, the MCO induces compliance with cost 
containment by means of capitation and financial incentives; 
stated otherwise, the MCO transfers the financial risk of 
health insurance from itself to its affiliated physicians. 
These changes create the possibility that patients may be 
injured in new ways,22 and have important implications for 
medical malpractice. 
Historically, malpractice liability has been narrowly 
applied to the direct provider of health care - the 
physician. Since the beginning of this century, physicians 
have exercised virtually complete authority over the 
standard and delivery of care.23 In this cultural and 
For example, patients may be denied certain diagnostic procedures and 
treatments, and their physicians may be prohibited from freely 
discussing alternative options. At some point, there is an unavoidable 
conflict between the need to control costs, and the ability to maintain 
the quality of care delivered. This "dark side" of managed care is 
discussed at length in Symposium, The Dark Side of Health Care 
Containment: Emerging Legal Issues in Managed Care, 14 Seton Hall Legis. 
J. 1 (1990). See also Arnold S. Reiman, The New Medical - Industrial 
Complex, 303 New Eng. J. Med. 963 (1980) (discussing dangers created by 
the emergence of for-profit health care). 
23 Even though physician fees account for 15-20% of health care costs, 
physicians control 70-90% of total health care expenditures. The 
physician's authority to determine whether and where to hospitalize 
patients provided great leverage over hospitals. Likewise, the ability 
to prescribe particular drugs and supplies gave physicians similar 
influence over pharmaceutical companies and medical suppliers. See 
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professional context, where physicians were sovereign with 
respect to care, it was appropriate that they bore sole 
liability for negligent actions. 
The twin crises of cost and malpractice have recently 
invited much debate over controlling medical costs, as well 
as reforming liability law. Unfortunately, these debates 
have taken place simultaneously but in relative isolation 
from one another. Very little attention has been given to 
evaluating both problems as part of a coherent strategy. 
This is a serious shortcoming, for it is impossible to grasp 
the full dimensions of the crises without seeing that they 
are inextricably connected. 
The law of malpractice did not arise from a vacuum; 
rather, it has been rooted in the economic, cultural, and 
ethical reality of medical practice over the past century.24 
Starr, supra note 5, at 26-27; Arnold S. Reiman, The Allocation of 
Medical Resources by Physicians, 55 J. Med. Educ. 99, 99 (1980) (arguing 
that, because physicians effectively control the vast majority of health 
resources, only by modifying physician behavior can medical costs be 
restrained). 
24 The system of cross-subsidization and third-party insurance 
reimbursement effectively shielded both providers and patients from cost 
concerns. Patients had little incentive to refrain from seeking care 
because a third party was paying (a problem of moral hazard), and 
providers had the incentive to provide all care that could be of any 
benefit. This economic scenario contributed to the ethical norm that 
viewed the physician as a fiduciary expected to deploy scarce health 
resources for the benefit of the individual patient without regard to 
broader societal concerns. See E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by 
Reassigning Responsibility, 20 Am. J.L. & Med. 79 (1994). 
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For much of this erstwhile period, physicians could 
determine care independent of cost. Indeed, malpractice law 
forbade physicians from altering the standard of care based 
on their patient's financial status.25 The rapid expansion 
of managed care has fundamentally changed this dynamic. 
Cost decisions that invariably have clinical 
consequences are now made by corporate managers, yet 
liability continues to be based on an outdated view of 
medical practice.26 Physicians have already lost their 
monopoly on medical control, and it is time for them to 
lose their monopoly on liability as well. This thesis 
argues that the traditional physician-centered model of 
malpractice should be replaced by managed care enterprise 
As one court explained, "whether the patient be a pauper or a 
millionaire, whether he be treated gratuitously or for reward, the 
physician owes him precisely the same measure of duty, and the same 
degree of skill and care." John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the 
Unitary Medical Malpractice Standard, 77 Va. L. Rev. 439, 441-42 (1991) 
(quoting Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (C.P. N.Y. City & County 
1891)). This legal requirement does not, however, preclude disparities 
in care based upon ability to pay, even though it is so intended. 
26 As one physician commented, "We have moved from a world where the 
payor calls the doctor to one where the payor calls the tune." Duffy & 
Slayman, Managed Care and Managed Competition, in Driving Down Health 
Care Costs: Strategies & Solutions, 1990, at 203 (1989). 
27 Physicians have managed to achieve a state-sanctioned monopoly over 
the medical profession through licensing and educational requirements. 
In addition, the medical profession preserved its authority and autonomy 
through the legal doctrine prohibiting the "corporate practice of 
medicine." See Starr, supra note 5, at 204-20. 
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liability. Although enterprise liability disappeared from 
the public forefront with the defeat of the Clinton Plan, 
the concept has a rich legal history and finds considerable 
intellectual support.28 
Part II of this thesis begins by tracing the growth of 
managed care, and examining some of its more common 
organizational forms. Part III describes the traditional 
law of medical malpractice, and the current state of 
malpractice reform. Part IV outlines the legal bases for 
managed care liability, and shows how the courts have 
bypassed executive and legislative inaction to take the lead 
in establishing various theories of liability against MCOs. 
Part V explains why enterprise liability would probably 
better accomplish the normative goals of the liability 
system than alternative proposals, and Part VI addresses 
some of the threshold issues involved in testing the 
comparative advantages of enterprise liability. 
Academic support for medical enterprise liability has existed for a 
number of years. See generally Barry R. Furrow, Symposium: Enterprise 
Liability and Health Care Reform: Managing Care and Managing Risk, 3 9 
St. Louis L.J. 77 (1994); Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra 
note 7, at 122-32; 2 American Law Inst., Reporters' Study: Enterprise 
Responsibility for Personal Injury 113-19 (1991). 
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF MANAGED CARE 
A. THE GROWTH OF MANAGED CARE 
MCOs have grown in both number and significance in 
recent years.29 Today, 57% of the entire U.S. population is 
enrolled in managed care.30 Of the 160 million people with 
employer-sponsored health insurance, an estimated 65% are 
under some form of MCO; by contrast, only 5-10% were 
enrolled in such plans in 1980.31 Approximately 83% of 
32 
physicians are under contract with at least one MCO. One 
recent analysis predicts that by the year 2000, up to 65% of 
all Americans will receive their health care through 
integrated managed care plans.33 
This transition has been especially painful for elite academic 
centers, which have struggled to maintain their research and teaching 
roles in the face of cost containment. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Elite 
Hospitals of New York City in Financial Bind, N.Y. Times, February 13, 
1995, at Al, B4; Milt Freudenheim, Hospitals' New Creed: Less is Best, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1994, at D1. 
30 Geri Aston, HHS: Managed Care Applied Brakes to '95 Health Spending, 
Am. Med. News, Feb. 17, 1997, at 5. 
31 Jon Gabel et al. , The Changing World of Group Health Insurance, 
Health Affairs, Summer 1988, at 48. 
32 Aston, supra note 30, at 5; Physicians participating in any form of 
MCO derive, on average, 35% of their revenues from managed care sources. 
Solo practitioners have substantially lower rates of participation (39%) 
than physicians in large group practices (78%). John K. Iglehart, 
Health Policy Report: Physicians and the Growth of Managed Care, 331 New 
Eng. J. Med. 1167 (1994). 
33 Id. at 1167. Even traditional indemnity insurance is now usually 
provided as managed fee-for-service coverage, because physicians 
services are subject to external utilization review. Id. 
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The origins of managed care can be traced back to the 
late 1920s, where, in 1927, the Community Hospital of Elk 
City, Oklahoma, established the first medical cooperative. 
In 1929, the Ross-Loos Medical Group arranged to provide 
medical care on a prepaid basis to employees of the Los 
Angeles Water and Power Department.34 During the mid-1930s, 
the Kaiser Foundation Health Plans delivered multispecialty 
prepaid health care to Kaiser employees working on the Grand 
Coulee Dam in Washington State; from this modest beginning 
arose Kaiser Permanente, the largest MCO in existence 
today.35 
Managed care remained a rather quiescent concept until 
the 1970s, when sharply rising medical costs prompted 
private employers to consider alternatives to fee-for- 
service health care.36 Prior to the 1970s, the third-party 
See Diana J. Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of 
Liability in the Managed Health Care Industry, 4 7 Baylor L. Rev. 28 5, 
291 (1995). 
35 Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and 
Enterprise Liability, 22 Am J.L. & Med. 7, 27 (1996). 
36 See supra note 3. Health care spending rose from $12.7 billion in 
1950 to $458 billion in 1986. During the same period, the average cost 
of a hospital stay rose from $127 to $3,527. These rates of increase 
were four times greater than the rate of inflation over the same period. 




insurance system had generally reimbursed medical care on an 
open-ended basis, covering all care that was "medically 
necessary."37 Under this arrangement, neither patients 
(whose costs were paid by a third party) nor providers (who 
were reimbursed more by providing more service) had much 
incentive to economize; not surprisingly, costs rose.38 
A further boost to the development of MCOs came from 
the Nixon Administration, which was seeking to promote forms 
of preventative care. After President Nixon signed the 
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,39 health 
maintenance organizations ("HMOs")40 meeting federal 
standards could demand that large businesses providing 
For a historical account of the third-party insurance system, see R. 
Fein, Medical Care, Medical Costs (1986). 
38 Certainly other factors have also contributed to the persistent 
escalation of costs: an aging population, newer and more expensive 
technologies, overcapacity, administrative inefficiencies, government 
regulation, economic inflation, and malpractice liability. Nonetheless, 
most commentators agree that lasting cost containment can only be 
achieved by some restriction of "marginally beneficial" care. The 
obvious difficulty lies in defining care that is of marginal benefit. 
See Karen Davis et al. , Health Care Cost Containment 11 (1990); William 
B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Containment 
Strategies: Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA 220 
(1987) . 
39 Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (1973) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3OOe et seq. (1996)). 
4 0 
The term "health maintenance organization" was originally coined by 
Paul Elwood in 197 0, to emphasize the preventative nature of this form 
of pre-paid health care. Kilcullen, supra note 35, at 26. 
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health insurance offer their employees a choice: the HMO 
must be offered as an alternative to conventional 
insurance.41 These HMOs were also eligible to obtain 
42 
financial assistance through federal grants and loans. 
Against this backdrop of rising costs and federal 
support, the successful proliferation of managed care is 
related to the overall restructuring of health care that has 
taken place in the past two decades. As the demand for 
acute inpatient care has declined, hospitals - once the 
focal hub of health care delivery - have combined with one 
another (a form of "horizontal integration")43 to reduce 
overcapacity and achieve greater efficiencies. Hospitals 
41 Id. at 26. 
42 A total of $145 million in grants and $219 million in loans were made 
available to 115 HMOs between 1973 and 1983. Id. at 26. HMOs 
experienced another growth spurt from 1983 to 1988, when HMO coverage 
was expanded to Medicare and Medicaid eligibles. In addition, almost 
all states passed enabling statutes to allow HMOs to surmount the 
barrier presented by the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Barry 
R. Furrow et al. , Health Law § 8-1, at 309 (1995) (hereinafter Health 
Law) . 
43 Horizontal integration refers to the merger of separate firms, each 
producing the same good or service, in an attempt to achieve economies 
of scale and to increase market power. The 1970s and early 1980s were 
dominated by the horizontal integration of hospitals, both locally as 
well as national and regional consolidations. Douglas A. Conrad & 
Stephen M. Shortell, Integrated Health Systems: Promise and Performance, 
13 Frontiers of Health Services Management 3 (1996). 
4 4 
There were 138 publicly announced hospital mergers and acquisitions 
in 1995, up from 94 in 1994. Aston, supra note 30, at 6. 
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also restructured themselves by diversifying into those 
facilities experiencing increased demand: ambulatory, home, 
rehabilitation, and skilled-nursing care services.45 
However, the most important kind of restructuring, 
representing the true essence of managed care, takes the 
form of "vertical integration." Vertical integration refers 
to the combination of previously separate firms whose 
services are inputs to, or outputs from, the production of 
one another's services.46 Vertical integration is 
classically achieved by outright common ownership of the 
different services; alternatively, as is more commonly the 
case, the same benefits of ownership can be simulated by an 
elaborate web of contractual relationships.47 MCOs "manage 
care" by vertically integrating the financing and delivery 
functions. 
Diversification, as opposed to horizontal integration, refers to 
entering businesses other than the core business. These businesses may 
or may not be related in some way to the core business. See Conrad & 
Shortell, supra note 43. 
46 The economic goals of vertical integration are: (1) to lower 
transaction costs between separate downstream and upstream processes 
(e.g., the financing and delivery of care) by substituting within-firm 
exchanges under a single organization for market transactions between 
two separate firms, and (2) to achieve economies of scope by sharing 
common inputs (e.g. physicians and nurses) across related processes. 
Id. 
47 Long-term exclusive contracts, strategic alliances, and carefully 
constructed interorganizational affiliations all represent means of 
attaining vertical integration without common ownership. Id. 

17 
B. COMMON ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS OF MANAGED CARE 
Integrated health care systems can be embodied in many 
different forms,48 and MCOs can be sponsored by any number 
of different "players" (e.g., insurance companies, 
hospitals, employers, unions, community groups, and even 
physicians have organized to sponsor health plans). The 
variety of forms and participants reflects the creativity of 
the legal and business planners. As will be discussed in 
Part IV of this paper, the particular form of MCO has 
relevance from a liability standpoint. Two of the more 
commonly encountered forms of MCOs are described below. 
See generally Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a 
Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 
18 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & Law 75 (1993); John K. Iglehart, The American 
Health Care System: Managed Care, 327 New Eng. J. Med. 742 (1992); 
Robert Shouldice, Introduction to Managed Care: Health Maintenance 
Organizations, Preferred Provider Organizations, and Competitive Medical 
Plans (1991) . 
49 All types of participants are sponsoring MCOs for various reasons: 
hospitals to maintain or increase market share; physicians to retain 
autonomy over clinical practice; insurance companies to increase profits 
and protect market share; employers to control costs; entrepreneurs of 
all sorts to profit from a industry experiencing rapid growth. 
Ironically, the group least actively involved appears to be the one most 
affected - patients. See Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, 
Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients 




1. Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") 
An HMO is an entity that provides comprehensive health 
care to an enrolled membership for a fixed per-capita fee. 
They represent the most popular form of MCO: over 600 HMOs 
have a collective enrollment exceeding 56 million 
Americans.50 HMOs are typically classified into four sub¬ 
categories based on their relationship with providers:51 
• The staff model HMO directly employs physicians 
and compensates them as salaried employees. The physicians 
generally work in facilities owned by the HMO, and receive 
the benefits of centralized staffing, equipment, and 
administration. 
• The group model HMO contracts with an independent 
group of physicians (usually an incorporated or partnership 
multispecialty group practice), rather than employing 
See Phil Douglas, Medicine's Brave New World, Phys. Practice Dig., 
Fall 1995, at 12. At the end of 1991, California had the highest HMO 
penetration, with an enrollment of 41% of the insured population. 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Oregon all had HMO penetration rates in 
excess of 30%. On the other hand, Arkansas, Idaho, Maine, Montana, 
North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee all had 
penetration rates less than 5%. See 1 Managed Care Resource Guide 1 
(Spring 1994) . 
51 See Jeannine M. Foran, Managed Care Systems: Understanding the 
Phenomenon, Med. Malpractice L. & Strategy, Apr. 1995, at 1-3. 
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individual physicians. Care is provided to the HMO's 
enrollees at the physician group's facilities for a 
capitated fee.52 
• The network model HMO contracts with several 
groups of providers to provide care at a capitated rate. 
These providers typically also serve patients not belonging 
to the HMO, such as their separate fee-for-service patients 
as well as patients enrolled in other MCOs. 
• The Individual Practice Association ("IPA") model 
HMO contracts first with an IPA (usually a corporation or 
partnership comprised of independent physicians), which in 
turn contracts with each individual physician. The 
physicians generally use their own facilities, keep their 
own records, and maintain private practices outside the HMO. 
The HMO pays a capitated fee to the IPA, and the IPA then 
pays each physician on a fee-for-services or other basis. 
A recent study of HMOs found that 48% were IPA model, 
14% network model, and 38% staff or group-model.53 As the 
52 Capitation involves the payment of a lump sum per member as 
compensation, regardless of the number of services actually provided to 
each member. Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 34, at 293. 
53 Health Law, supra note 42,§ 8-1, at 309. 
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industry continues to develop, the lines of distinction 
among these categories will gradually fade. 
2. Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPOs") 
The PPO is a more recent innovation whereby organized 
groups of providers (e.g., hospitals, physicians, lab 
facilities) contract to offer care at a discounted fee-for- 
service in exchange for a large volume of subscribers.54 A 
PPO more closely resembles traditional insurance in that 
subscribers are not obligated to use only the preferred 
providers; however, if a non-preferred provider is chosen, 
the cost to the subscriber rises.55 
C. COST-CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES OF MANAGED CARE 
Regardless of which form an MCO takes, the ability to 
control the utilization of resources is key to the cost- 
containment effort. MCOs use a number of techniques aimed 
Iglehart, supra note 32, at 1168. 
55 Patients are strongly encouraged to use the preferred providers 
through financial incentives such as lower deductibles, higher benefit 
levels, and reduced or nonexistent coinsurance. Id. 
56 For an account of the causes of rising medical costs since 1960, see 
supra note 38 and accompanying text. See also Edward B. Hirshfeld, 
Commentaries: Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians be 
Changed to Accommodate New Models for Rationing Health Care?, 140 U. Pa. 




at reducing costs and increasing profits. Some methods 
stress preventive care, achieve economies of scale, or 
reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies. Others are far more 
problematic, directly affecting the physician-patient 
relationship by striking at the issues of quality and 
control. These can be broadly classified as either resource 
restraining or financial risk-shifting strategies. 
1. Resource Restraining Strategies 
• Utilization Review. Utilization review ("UR") 
refers to processes used to evaluate the necessity and 
appropriateness of medical care at various stages in its 
delivery. UR can occur prospectively, concurrently, or 
retrospectively, and can be performed by either the MCO or 
an independent third-party reviewer.58 Examples of UR 
Profit is a very important consideration for many MCOs, especially 
those organized as for-profit corporations; many have raised capital 
from investors by issuing shares in the public equity markets. There 
has been much criticism that the savings created by MCOs often seem to 
benefit well-paid corporate managers at the expense of patients. See 
Mike Mitka, HMO Executives Claim Fat Paychecks, Am. Med. News, Feb. 5, 
1996, at 3 (top managed care salaries ranged from $2.3 million for the 
CEO of Humana, Inc. to a whopping $14.28 million for the CEO of 
HealthSource, Inc.). 
58 
The effects of prospective or concurrent UR on patient care are 
potentially much greater than those of retrospective UR. If the 
physician's proposed clinical plan fails approval, a fundamental 
conflict arises: the physician will either have to change the treatment 
plan or provide it anyway with little hope of reimbursement. David D. 
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include precertification of elective hospitalizations, 
mandatory second opinions for surgical procedures, and 
review of hospital lengths of stay and laboratory tests. 
• Practice Parameters. Practice parameters are 
standardized protocols for care based upon empirical 
evidence. Depending on how much latitude is permitted, they 
can take the form of guidelines (which are flexible), 
standards (which are inflexible), or options (which are 
descriptive protocols but not prescriptive).59 Practice 
parameters are also commonly referred to as treatment 
algorithms, clinical outcomes, or quality-assurance 
procedures. 
• Gatekeepers. Physicians have always served as the 
de facto gatekeepers to health care.60 However, as used in 
the parlance of managed care, "gatekeepers" refer to those 
primary care physicians who limit specialty care referrals. 
Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for Medical 
Treatment Decisions, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 861, 885 (1991). 
59 See generally David M. Eddy, Designing a Practice Policy: Standards, 
Guidelines and Options, 263 JAMA 3077 (1990); Lucian L. Leape, Practice 
Guidelines and Standards: An Overview, 16 Quality Rev. Bull. 42 (1990). 
60 See supra note 23 (describing how physicians have traditionally 
controlled the allocation of health care services). 
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MCOs often require patients to obtain prior gatekeeper 
approval before access to specialists is permitted. 
2. Financial Risk-Shifting Strategies 
• Capitation. Capitation prospectively reimburses 
providers a fixed payment per patient, regardless of the 
6 2 
amount of services the patient actually requires. If the 
patient ultimately needs more care than was anticipated, the 
costs must be absorbed by the provider. This creates a 
powerful incentive to minimize "unnecessary" care, but may 
place the physician in conflict with the patient's best 
interests.63 
• Financial Incentives. Financial incentive systems 
tie a provider's compensation to the utilization of medical 
services, and typically take the form of bonuses and 
Kilcullen, supra note 35, at 27. 
62 Hirshfeld, supra note 56, at 1827. The concept of capitation is not 
new. In 1983, Congress adopted the Diagnosis-Related Groups ("DRGs") 
program for hospitalized Medicare patients. The DRG system created an 
administrative price system based upon an average cost calculation for a 
particular diagnosis. Hospitals had a powerful incentive to be "DRG 
efficient" by keeping real costs lower than DRG reimbursement. See 
Dolenc & Dougherty, DRGs: The Counterrevolution in Financing Health 
Care, 15 Hastings Center Rep. 19 (June 1985). 
63 See Boyle, Should We Learn to Say No, 252 JAMA 782 (1984) (arguing 
that physicians should reaffirm their ethical duty to act in the best 
interests of individual patients, despite increasing cost constraints). 
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penalties targeted to the amount of resources used over a 
period of time. Like capitation, they function to influence 
physician behavior by shifting the risk of health insurance 
to physicians.64 
MCOs employ these cost-containment strategies in 
varying degrees, and no standard pattern exists regarding 
the possible arrangements for resource control and risk 
sharing.65 Several of these strategies seek to reverse the 
incentives that formerly existed under traditional third- 
party insurance - under capitation, for instance, the less 
care that is provided, the more the physician is reimbursed. 
But how effective are these strategies in actually 
controlling costs? More importantly, how is the quality of 
care impacted? 
See Marsha R. Gold et al. , A National Survey of the Arrangements 
Managed-Care Plans Make with Physicians, 333 New Eng. J. Med. 1678 
(1995) (survey of 130 managed care plans found a range of review 




D. IMPACT OF MANAGED CARE ON COST AND QUALITY 
Many studies show that managed care has succeeded in 
reducing health care costs.66 The Rand Corporation found 
that HMO enrollees use 40% fewer hospital days and incur 25% 
fewer expenses than similarly matched patients in fee-for- 
service plans.67 Another study by the federal Congressional 
Budget Office estimated that if all people insured in 1992 
had been enrolled in staff- or group-model HMOs, health care 
6 8 
costs would have been $78 billion less. 
The most recent data reveal that health spending has 
significantly slowed, growing 5.1% to $937 billion in 1994 
and 5.5% to $988.5 billion in 1995 - the lowest rates of 
growth in three decades. This slowdown was most pronounced 
in the private sector, where managed care has made the 
greatest inroads. There, spending increased by just 2.9% in 
See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect 
Physician's Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health 
Maintenance Organizations?, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 86 (1989) (finding use 
of capitation or salaries associated with significantly lower rate of 
hospital utilization than fee-for-service). 
67 Willard G. Manning et al. , A Controlled Trial of the Effect of a 
Prepaid Group Practice on the Use of Services, 310 New Eng. J. Med. 1505 
(1984) . 
68 
Verdon S. Staines, Potential Impact of Managed Care on National 
Health Spending, Health Aff., 1993 Supp., at 248, 253. 
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1995. According to the Department of Health and Human 
Services, "This slow growth is linked to the expansion of 
managed care."69 
But even if MCOs successfully reduce costs, the quality 
of care they deliver remains at issue. MCOs are acutely 
sensitive to criticism that their cost containment might 
undermine quality. Aware that their economic success 
depends upon the public's perception of quality, MCOs have 
tried to control the content of communications through the 
use of "gag clauses." These restrictive covenants prevent 
affiliated physicians from freely discussing anything which 
"could undermine the confidence of enrollees or the public 
7 0 
in the quality of coverage" (emphasis added). 
Quality is obviously of critical importance, but 
locating and properly defining quality health care is 
difficult. A recent study of ambulatory patient responses 
to different service settings showed a higher degree of 
69 Aston, supra note 30, at 5. 
70 Steffie Woodhander & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New 
Corporate Proposition for Physicians, 333 New Eng. J. Med. 1706, 1706 
(1995). Physicians contend that "gag clauses" prevent them from 
discussing costly treatment options (e.g., bone marrow transplant) or 
their financial incentives to withhold care. The inclusion of gag 
clauses in MCO contracts has stirred enormous controversy, prompting 
many states to enact legislation banning their use. See Robert Pear, 
Laws Won't Let HMOs Tell Doctors What to Say: 16 States Give Patients 
Right to be Informed, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1996, at A12. 
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satisfaction with solo practitioners than either HMOs or 
multispecialty groups.71 Yet, other studies analyzing the 
utilization of services in treating particular illnesses 
showed no difference between HMOs and fee-for-service plans. 
For instance, separate studies comparing HMO and fee-for- 
service patients with colorectal cancer and rheumatoid 
arthritis revealed no difference in the care received.72 
There are two factors that make defining quality 
difficult. First, there is often a lack of certainty and 
professional consensus as to appropriate management. For 
many illnesses, there exists much variation in clinical 
practice with no apparent differences in outcome (e.g., life 
expectancy, morbidity, days missed from work). Research 
examining variations in medical treatment and how patients 
Patient satisfaction, a possible indicator of quality, was measured 
with respect to a range of issues, including office waits, time spent 
with providers and availability of appointments. Haya R. Rubin et al., 
Patients' Rating of Outpatient Visits in Different Practice Settings, 
270 JAMA 835 (1993). 
72 Reviews of patients with colorectal cancer showed no difference in 
treatment (surgery, chemotherapy or radiation therapy), length of stay 
or follow-up visits. Similarly, reviews of patients with rheumatoid 
arthritis showed no difference in admission rates, length of hospital 
stay, or rates of surgery. Davis, supra note 38, at 213-16. 
73 Different practice styles exist in different regions based on a local 
concept of good practice. See The Paradox of Appropriate Care, 258 JAMA 
2568 (1987); David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role 
of Uncertainty, Health Aff., Summer 1984; John Wennberg & A. Gittlesohn, 
Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 Science 1102 (1973) . 
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It is not my intent to judge MCO strategies in a 
negative light, or to imply that cost containment is not a 
valid or important societal issue. Rather, the strategies 
employed by MCOs necessarily implicate malpractice liability 
because, as the next section explains, current malpractice 
law demands that physicians adhere to a standard of care 
without regard to economics. 
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 
A. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 
Traditional medical malpractice is based upon the tort 
law of negligence.78 The first medical malpractice case in 
England, Stratton v. Cavendish, was recorded in 1375. In 
considering the botched hand surgery performed by Dr. 
Swanlon, the court compared the surgeon's error to that of a 
smithy: "If a smith undertakes to cure my horse, and the 
horse is harmed by his negligence or failure to cure in a 
Although physicians can be sued under other causes of action (e.g., 
breach of contract/warranty, infliction of emotional distress, fraud), 
the tort action of negligence constitutes medical malpractice, and is 
the major claim by which patients seek redress for injury. See Health 
Law, supra note 42,§§ 6-1, 6-4 (discussing other bases of physician 
liability besides negligence). 
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reasonable time, it is just that he should be liable" 
(emphasis added).79 
To prove a case of medical malpractice, the plaintiff 
must establish (1) the existence of a physician-patient 
relationship, (2) the appropriate standard of care, (3) the 
physician's breach of that standard, and (4) that the 
physician's breach caused the alleged injury and the damages 
sustained. In most areas of negligence law, the standard 
of care is a matter for the jury to determine.81 However, 
in medical malpractice cases, the standard of care is based 
82 
upon custom. 
William Carleton, Stratton v. Swanlon: The Fourteenth-Century- 
Ancestor of the Law of Malpractice, The Pharos 20 (Fall 1982) . The 
earliest recorded American case, Cross v. Guthery, occurred in 1794 
where a husband sued for damages resulting from an unskillful operation 
on his wife. 1 Am. Dec. 61 (1794) . For a historical survey of the 
development of the American law of malpractice, see Theodore Silver, One 
Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical Jurisprudence of Medical 
Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1193 (1992). 
80 A claim of negligence classically requires that four elements be 
shown: (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, (3) injury that was proximately 
caused by breach of duty, and (4) compensable damages. See W. Page 
Keeton et al. , Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, at 164-65 
(5th ed. 1984). 
81 The jury is typically instructed to evaluate the defendant's conduct 
under the "reasonable person" standard. Id.,§ 32, at 173. 
82 
The reasonable person standard presents unique problems in cases of 
medical malpractice because a lay jury is generally unqualified to judge 
independently the reasonableness of the physician's conduct. Thus, 
courts have looked to custom in establishing the required standard of 
care. See generally Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, 
Evidence, and Public Policy 139-43 (1985) (criticizing the use of custom 
to define the standard of care); Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom 
in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 Ind. L.J. 528 (1976); Joseph H. King, 
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The standard of care required is that "which is 
customary and usual in the profession, ordinarily possessed 
and employed by members in good standing" (emphasis 
added).83 Furthermore, this standard is a unitary one that 
is applicable regardless of economic resources. Each side 
attempts to establish the customary standard, and the 
defendant's compliance or lack thereof, through the 
testimony of medical experts. Because the law defers this 
8 6 
determination to the medical profession, it is incumbent 
Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The 
"Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 1213 (1975). 
83 Keeton et al., supra note 80,§ 32, at 187, 189. Custom is 
established in a decentralized, gradual manner by a flow of reports in 
medical literature, at meetings and in peer discussions. Over a period 
of time, "hundreds of comments can converge to form a policy, which if 
widely accepted, will become standard practice." Eddy, Clinical 
Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice, 307 New Eng. J. Med. 343 
(1982) . 
84 
There are a few exceptions allowing for alternative practice styles 
(e.g., "two schools of thought", "respectable minority", or "locality 
rule" doctrines) where these alternatives are each supported by a degree 
of consensus. Never, however, has the required standard of care been 
adjusted for economic considerations. See Siliciano, supra note 25, at 
441; E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical 
Care, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1719 (1987). 
85 The ensuing contest has been dubbed as "the battle of the experts." 
Each expert's testimony can be supported or supplemented by articles in 
medical journals, research reports, learned treatises, and drug company 
warnings. See Health Law, supra note 42,§ 6-2, at 243. The standard of 
care has evolved under the common law from a locality rule to a national 
standard for both specialists and generalists. Id.,% 9-2, at 342. 
8 6 
But see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (Supreme Court of 
Washington found negligence even though ophthalmologist acted in full 
accordance with customary practice (not to routinely screen young 
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upon the profession itself to formulate clear and consistent 
8 7 
guidelines. 
The standard of care is a critical concept, because it 
draws the boundary not only for purposes of medical 
malpractice, but also between care that is considered 
"necessary" and "unnecessary." Implicit in the reliance on 
custom is a supposition that only physicians have the proper 
authority to define appropriate medical standards of care 
for society. Likewise, the imposition of a unitary standard 
makes sense only if physicians are in a position to deliver 
care without regard to resource constraints. Under 
managed care, neither of these pretexts continues to exist. 
patients for glaucoma)). Other state courts have declined to 
independently judge the standard of care. 
8 7 
Whether this is actually accomplished is highly debatable. Many have 
criticized the battle of experts as a battle of "hired guns", whose 
contradictory testimony leaves the impression that the standard of care 
is vague, arbitrary, and unpredictable. The defendant physician is 
often held to a standard that reflects the "habit" of the expert 
testifying, which is not necessarily the "customary" standard of care. 
See Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in 
Malpractice Litigation, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1991, at 127; 
Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the 
Current Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 421 (1989); Expert Witnesses: Booming Business for the 
Specialists, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1987, at 1. 
88 In most areas of negligence law, there exists a general "Learned 
Hand" test (named after Judge Learned Hand) that measures negligence 
under a cost-benefit analysis. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 
159 F.2a 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (negligent action determined by 
weighing probability and severity of action against costs of 




The existing climate of managed care exposes a serious 
structural limitation in malpractice law's reliance on 
custom and its insistence on a unitary standard of care. 
These two rules reflect an outdated image of medical 
decision making, one in which the physician is free to act 
in the best interests of the patient, unimpeded by cost. 
Although the courts are gradually beginning to extend 
liability to MCOs,89 the law has been unwilling to adjust 
the standard of care required of physicians. Today's 
physicians are thus caught between the proverbial "rock and 
a hard place:" managed care may often require or encourage 
them to withhold care, but the tort system continues to 
suppose exclusive physician autonomy. 
B. TRENDS IN MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS AND LITIGATION: A 
MALPRACTICE CRISIS? 
The crisis of rising health care costs has coincided 
with a sense of crisis m the medical malpractice system 
stemming from soaring insurance premiums and claims over the 
89 See infra Part IV of this paper. 
90 , . 
Malpractice premiums and health care costs are related, in part, 
because the premium costs incurred by providers are incorporated into 
the fees charged to patients, although a time lag exists. Weiler, 
Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 4-5. 
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past thirty years.91 To illustrate the problem, in 1965, 
the average physician in New York State paid $1,000 (in 1990 
dollars) for liability coverage. By 1975, the cost for 
coverage had increased to $7,300, and by the late 1980s this 
figure was near $40,000 - a increase of 40 times in just two 
decades.92 
Most of the national rise in premiums took place in two 
bursts: the first in the mid-1970s, and the second in the 
mid-1980s. Between 1974 and 1976, overall provider premiums 
doubled from $500 million to $1 billion; after a period of 
leveling off, total premiums shot up again from $2.5 billion 
in 1983 to $7 billion in 1988.93 Since 1989, premiums have 
plateaued and even declined in some states. 
Alongside the increase in premiums has occurred a 
concomitant increase in the number ("frequency") of 
The crisis in medical malpractice since the 1960s was part of an 
overall crisis in tort liability generally. The area of products 
liability law also experienced dramatic increases in insurance premiums, 
claims rates, and damage awards. See The Insurance Crisis: Now Everyone 
is in a Risky Business, Bus. Wk., Mar. 10, 1986, at 88. 
92 See Paul C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, 
Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation 2 (1993). The cost of 
malpractice premiums varies greatly depending on specialty and location. 
Premium rates are generally determined by the claims experience of a 
class of physicians rather than the experience of the individual 
physician. Certain high-risk classes (e.g., obstetricians and surgical 
specialists) face premium costs of up to $200,000 per year. Weiler, 
Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 4. 
93 Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 5. 
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successful claims filed and the amount ("severity") of 
damages awarded. The total liability exposure faced by an 
insurer is a function of the frequency and severity of 
claims.94 Having failed to accurately predict the surge in 
malpractice litigation, several insurance carriers were 
forced out of business, while others precipitously raised 
their rates to cover large losses.95 
The spurt in malpractice litigation since 1970 has been 
attributed to several causes. Factors such as population 
growth, increased access to health care through Medicare and 
Medicaid, increased numbers of providers, increased use of 
complex medical technologies, and increased utilization of 
health care services contributed to the rise in claims 
frequency.97 Meanwhile, the rising severity of claims may 
id. at 2 . 
Medical malpractice insurance is sold by several types of insurers - 
commercial insurance companies, provider-owned mutual insurance funds, 
and joint underwriting associations with state medical societies. It is 
written either as an occurrence (covering any incident occurring during 
the policy period) or claims-made (covering only incidents for which 
claims are made during policy period) policy. Health Law, supra note 
42,§ 9-1, at 335. 
96 
Of all malpractice suits filed between 1935 and 1975, 80% were filed 
from 1970-1975. Id. at 332. 
97 Claims frequency increases if (1) the number of injured patients 
increases, (2) the number of injured patients filing claims increases, 
or (3) both injuries and claims-per-injury increase. According to 
estimates of claims frequency, roughly 1 in 25 physicians is now 
successfully sued for malpractice each year. Weiler, Medical 




be attributable, in part, to general medical inflation, as 
well as to changing legal, societal and jury attitudes." 
At first glance, the volatility in premiums and claims 
over the past thirty years understandably raises concern. 
But a deeper look questions whether a crisis really exists 
at all. Malpractice insurance premiums still represent less 
than 1% of total health care spending.100 Although certain 
high-risk specialists still incur large premium expenses, 
the average physician pays $16,000 per year for insurance, 
representing approximately 6% of gross income. Furthermore, 
the evidence indicates that physicians have generally been 
able to pass along the increased costs of insurance by 
charging higher fees101 - in real terms, their incomes have 
easily kept pace with premium expenses.102 
Since malpractice awards are largely used to pay plaintiff medical 
bills, and since health care costs have risen so dramatically, damage 
awards have grown partially to keep pace with rising medical costs. 
Health Law, supra note 42,§ 9-1, at 337. 
99 . 
Nationally, the average malpractice settlement jumped from $12,000 in 
1970 to $45,000 by 1978; by 1986, it topped $100,000. In the early 
1990s, a few extremely high damage awards disproportionately contributed 
to aggregate liability (e.g., a $127 million award against an Illinois 
ophthalmologist in 1991) . Weiler, A Measure of Malpractice, supra note 
92, at 5. 
100 As a percentage of total health care spending, malpractice premiums 
have only risen from 0.5% in 1960 to 1% today. Weiler, Medical 
Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 4. 
101 But there is often a "sticky" time lag in adjusting fees to costs; 
given the erratic, lurching pattern of previous premium increases, this 
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Perhaps, then, the impression that there has been a 
crisis in malpractice is misplaced. However, aside from 
purely pecuniary costs,103 malpractice litigation also exacts 
great emotional and psychological costs. A medical 
malpractice suit starkly places the physician-patient 
relationship at issue. To be sued by a patient is deeply 
hurtful to most physicians, because such a claim arises out 
of a relationship that was personal, caring, and 
therapeutic, not necessarily commercial. Some might argue 
that this aspect of malpractice effects a crisis of 
physician morale.105 
may be temporarily burdensome to some physicians. Id. at 4-5. Premium 
costs are also indirectly passed along to taxpayers because insurance 
premiums are tax deductible expenses. 
102 It may be more difficult for physicians to pass along higher premiums 
in the future given the cost constraints of managed care. On the other 
hand, managed care may partially stem further incremental lurches in 
malpractice premiums by controlling health care costs. 
103 
The malpractice system exerts substantial costs in the forms of 
insurance premiums, claims awards, and defensive medicine (estimated to 
be $10 to $15 billion per year). See supra note 9. 
104 • • 
See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physician's Point of View Concerning 
Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic 
Importance of "Tort Reform", 23 Ga. L. Rev. 295 (1989). 
105 . . 
The threat of litigation may harm the trust that exists between 
physicians and patients, and can breed a sense of cynicism and 
resentment among physicians. See Sara C. Charles et al. , Sued and 
Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported Reactions to Malpractice Litigation, 
142 Am. J. Psych. 437 (1985). 
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Nonetheless, I would focus attention on a malpractice 
problem that now exists, albeit of a different nature. The 
malpractice climate takes place within the interaction of 
three systems: the insurance system, the health care system, 
and, of course, the legal system.106 The former two have, in 
many respects, fully integrated themselves in the name of 
managed care. Yet the legal system continues to treat 
malpractice law as if the three were autonomous and 
separate. 
The "true" malpractice crisis issue is not whether 
physicians can absorb increases in insurance premiums, or 
even whether they can emotionally deal with the stress of 
litigation. Rather, the proper question is whether, in 
light of the structural changes in health care, physicians 
should remain a locus of negligence liability. Malpractice 
law continues to hold physicians to a unitary standard of 
care based upon custom - a custom that physicians 
establish. But if they no longer have the ability to 
106 See Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
There are actually two insurance systems - malpractice liability 
insurance and health care insurance. But they are connected to each 
other in two important ways: (1) malpractice premiums are ultimately 
incorporated into health care insurance premiums via physician fees, and 
(2) managed care health insurance plans can affect physician utilization 
of services. 
107 
See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text. 
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fully implement their custom, then surely a crisis of 
malpractice exists. 
C. MEDICAL INJURY, PATIENT COMPENSATION AND ACCIDENT 
PREVENTION UNDER THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
The tort system no doubt exerts a burden on all its 
participants (doctors, insurers, even attorneys); but 
perhaps the greatest burden is suffered by the recipient of 
care - the patients. They face a system that can be 
painstakingly slow and capricious in compensating victims, 
yet which also does a highly questionable job in deterring 
accidents. Much of the academic analysis concerning the 
malpractice tort system comes by way of two major studies 
conducted during the 1970s and 1980s. 
These studies both suggest that the actual rate of 
patient injury due to medical negligence far exceeds the 
number of tort claims filed. The first study, conducted 
This may be particularly true with respect to the poor and elderly. 
Such groups may be more susceptible to injury, but less likely to have 
the resources to pursue claims. See Richard L. Abel, Review: L's of 
Cure, Ounces of Prevention, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1003, 1006-7 (1985). 
109 
Each of these studies used the same methodology of having neutral 
physicians carefully review the medical records of hospitalized 
patients: the California Study examined the records of 20,000 patients, 
while the Harvard Study examined the records of 31,000 patients. 
Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 12. 
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in California in the 1970s ("California Study"), discovered 
that 1 in 22 of hospitalized patients suffered a disabling 
iatrogenic injury; of these, 1 in 6 was considered caused by 
negligence. Yet only 1 malpractice claim was filed for 10 
such negligence events.110 
A later study conducted in New York State by the 
Harvard Medical Practice Study Group ("Harvard Study"),* * 111 
reached similar findings. Although the rate of iatrogenic 
injury was lower (1 in 27 hospitalizations) , the rate of 
negligence was greater (1 in 4 iatrogenic injuries). The 
rate of claims filing was, however, slightly higher (1 for 
every 8 events of negligence) compared to the California 
Study.112 
The Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, as it was called, was 
commissioned by the California Medical and Hospital Associations. See 
California Medical Association, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, 
(Donald H. Mills ed., 1977); Danzon, supra note 82, at 22-25. 
111 Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: 
Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New 
York (1990) . For a comprehensive summary of the findings of the Harvard 
Study, see Weiler, A Measure of Malpractice, supra note 92; Troyen A. 
Brennan et al. , Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in 
Hospitalized Patients, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 370 (1991) . 
112 ... . 
Not all negligent injuries are "serious." Both the California and 
Harvard Studies' definition of "iatrogenic event" was rather broad: a 
prolongation of hospital stay by more than one day due to care. 
However, even when considering only serious negligent injuries (those to 
patients under 70 producing disabilities (or death) lasting more than 6 
months) , only 1 in 7 claims was filed in California, and only 1 out of 
every 3 such events in New York resulted in tort payment. See Danzon, 
supra note 82, at 25; Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 
7, at 12-13. 
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The important implication of the California and Harvard 
Studies, if their data can be fairly extrapolated, is that a 
large gap exists between the number of injuries due to 
negligence and those that result in malpractice claims. 
Approximately 1% of all hospitalized patients suffer a 
negligent medical injury, but claims are filed in only 10 to 
. 113 
15% of all instances of negligence. 
Yet another issue concerns the validity of the claims 
that do get filed. The Harvard Study went beyond the 
California Study by actually matching each individually 
filed claim of negligence with the respective hospital 
chart. Its findings were disturbing in that most of the 
claims brought were "invalid" - that is, no negligence 
actually occurred. This means that even fewer valid cases 
of negligence resulted in claims (perhaps as low as 1 in 
50) ,114 
A large reason for this gap is that it is difficult for patients to 
even know that they have been harmed by medical treatment, let alone 
that their provider acted below the required standard of care. Weiler, 
Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 74. 
114 • • 
The Harvard Study found that poor, elderly, and minority patients 
suffered higher negligence rates, with age and health care insurance 
status being the strongest determinants of negligent injury. Hospitals 
varied in negligence, with teaching hospitals having relatively lower 
rates of negligence. For a complete discussion of the data, see Weiler, 
A Measure of Malpractice, supra note 92. 
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Given that many negligent injuries never result in 
claims, and that many of the claims that do get filed are 
without merit, it would appear that the current tort system 
does a poor job in compensating the victims of negligence. 
Many injured victims never seek redress because attorneys 
hesitate to accept cases where the potential recovery does 
not justify the expenses of litigation.115 Furthermore, of 
the victims who do receive some form of compensation (either 
settlement or jury verdict) , the size and nature of the 
award tends to be distributed quite unevenly.116 For those 
"lucky" enough to receive eventual compensation, the median 
wait is three years.117 
Leaving aside the issue of compensation, one of the 
main defenses to the current tort system is its role in 
Most malpractice injury attorneys are paid on a contingency fee 
basis, where they collect only if the plaintiff wins. Attorneys will be 
reluctant to accept a case that does not offer a good chance for 
recovery. See Health Law, supra note 42,§ 9-4, at 349. 
116 The size of jury verdicts has recently escalated, especially the 
portions attributed to pain and suffering as opposed to economic losses. 
Awards of millions of dollars are now commonplace. However, the 
compensation is greatly skewed as 5% of successful plaintiffs receive 
over 50% of the total amount of jury awards. Weiler, Medical 
Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 48. 
117 • 
According to the General Accounting Office survey of malpractice 
claims, the median time from injury to tort claim was 13 months, and the 
time from claim to payment was another 23 months. Thus, the typical 
injured patient waits 3 years before receiving any form of compensation. 
See U.S. General Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: Characteristics 




deterring accidents and promoting quality. Some claim 
that the system of fault-based physician liability serves as 
a check against careless medical practice. After all, 
many physicians state that they feel compelled to practice 
defensive medicine.120 This argument, however, (1) 
overstates the degree of deterrence achievable in light of 
malpractice insurance, and (2) fails to appreciate the 
context of how most negligence actually occurs. 
First, physicians do not face the economic consequences 
of negligence directly because any recovery will be paid by 
their insurer. Further, those physicians who have lost 
prior lawsuits generally do not pay higher premiums - their 
rates continue to be determined by the claims experience of 
a peer group of doctors practicing in the same region.121 
Arguments have been made on both sides of this issue, but unlike the 
case with respect to compensation, there is little empirical data 
available. Thus, most arguments about the effect of tort law on 
prevention rely on logical inferences. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on 
Trial, supra note 7, at 72-73. 
119 . 
For an economic analysis of tort law's deterrent effect, see William 
B. Schwartz & Neil K. Komesar, Doctors, Damages, and Deterrence: An 
Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 New Eng. J. Med. 1282 (1978). 
120 
As noted before, the indirect costs of defensive medicine are 
substantial, ranging from $10-$15 billion per year. See supra note 9. 
But the tort system may only spur doctors to practice defensive medicine 
to avoid lawsuits, not to avoid patient injury - these are not 
necessarily the same thing. 
121 . 
Because doctors are segmented into relatively small insurance pools, 
one or two huge awards can sharply drive up premiums for all members of 
the class, even those not responsible for any negligence. Weiler, 
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Although it might seem odd that premiums do not reflect 
one's likelihood of committing negligence, the reason they 
122 
do not underlines the very nature of medical malpractice. 
For the vast majority of doctors, a malpractice lawsuit 
is a random, haphazard event.123 This is not to say that 
physicians do not suffer from temporary lapses of attention, 
but only that inevitable human errors which produce both 
injury and a lawsuit are hard to predict; a past lawsuit is 
not a good predictor of future negligence. Insurance 
carriers acknowledge this, and therefore price premiums to 
reflect the claims experience of a group of physicians. 
Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 16. In addition, many 
physicians are unable to practice part-time or perform certain 
specialized procedures on a limited basis without paying a full annual 
premium for coverage. This may limit the availability of certain 
medical services in rural or inner-city areas. Id. at 85-86. 
122 • 
Despite its tenuous financial incentives, tort law may still deter 
negligence by providing strong psychic incentives to practice good care. 
Physicians certainly fear the personal and professional stigma 
associated with malpractice suits, and they tend to overestimate the 
likelihood of a lawsuit by a factor of several times. Weiler, Medical 
Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 76. See also Peter A. Bell, 
Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: 
Thoughts about the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 939 (1984) . 
123 See Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 14. 
124 , , 
The deterrent effect of a malpractice suit is undermined by the 
infrequency of claims and unpredictability of awards. Although 
physicians are concerned about the threat of malpractice as a general 
matter, and may well engage in the "window dressing" of defensive 
medicine, it is unlikely that core changes in their behavior are 
influenced by the remote and random threat of malpractice litigation. 
See Charles et al., supra note 105. 

45 
Hence, a strong case has been made for expanding the 
burden of liability to the health care enterprise (e.g., 
hospital or health plan), which can better distribute the 
125 
risk of negligence among a broad pool of practitioners. 
Obstetricians presently incur premiums that may be ten times 
greater than those that internists pay. But this is not 
because obstetricians are ten times more careless than 
internists; rather, when errors are committed by 
obstetricians, the resulting harms are likely to be much 
greater in magnitude.126 
A move to enterprise liability would also improve the 
quality of care because liability would then rest with the 
entity most capable of promoting quality-enhancing 
changes.127 Many instances of negligence are more 
Because malpractice suits tend to be a random event, it is very 
difficult to accurately base premiums on the claims experience of a 
single physician. The enterprise can price risk far more efficiently 
because it can draw upon the claims experience of a large group of 
physicians across all specialties. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on 
Trial, supra note 7, at 78. 
126 Different medical specialists have different diagnostic and treatment 
methods available to them. The invasiveness of surgery, for example, 
entails risks and harms far different than the methods commonly employed 
by pediatricians. The explosive growth of new medical technologies has 
expanded the array of caretaking approaches, but learning and mastering 
these technologies takes time; the "standard of care" thus evolves in a 
disparate manner among the different specialties. 
127 
See Sage et al., supra note 14, at 13-15. See also Laura L. Morlock 
& Faye E. Malitz, Do Hospital Risk Management Programs Make a 
Difference?: Relationship Between Risk Management Program Activities and 
Hospital Malpractice Claims Experience, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 
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attributable to institutional characteristics than 
individual slipups.128 By investing in information and 
management technologies, the enterprise can identify and 
improve upon systematic elements that contribute to 
negligence. An individual physician simply lacks the same 
resources to establish etiology and effect practice 
changes.129 
The two arguments presented above for enterprise 
liability - efficient risk spreading and quality-enhancing 
systems development - are reasons enough to take the idea 
seriously. There is, however, a third reason why enterprise 
liability merits consideration: the current physician- 
centered tort system is not compatible with managed care 
cost-containment reform. 
1991; Donald M. Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health 
Care, 320 New Eng. J. Med. 53 (1989). 
128 For example, errors with respect to medication dosing or allergic 
effects are often due to deficient record tracking or charting, as 
opposed to incompetent professional judgment. These errors are better 
remedied by improving information gathering and communication at the 
institutional level. Sage et al., supra note 14, at 15. 
129 
These ideas are best illustrated by a concrete case study. Concerned 
with the incidence and costs of anesthesia-related negligence, a group 
of anesthesiologists at the Harvard teaching hospitals developed a set 
of standards and procedures for monitoring the mishaps that commonly 
occur in anesthesia. Their results were impressive: the per-case cost 
of implementing the procedures was far less than the per-case cost of 
malpractice premiums, and the incidents of negligence dropped. See John 
H. Eichhorn et al. , Standards for Patient Monitoring during Anesthesia 
at Harvard Medical School, 256 JAMA 1017 (1986) . 
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A physician who feels that a certain costly procedure 
is "unnecessary" takes a big risk in deviating even slightly 
from medical custom.130 The previous third-party payment 
system made it feasible for physicians to perform procedures 
and order tests even if their utility was questionable. 
However, this level of discretion is increasingly 
unavailable under managed care, yet liability continues to 
rest on the physician's shoulders. It is imperative that 
meaningful tort reform accompany cost-containment reform. 
Before delving any deeper into the justification for 
managed care enterprise liability, I will next examine the 
attempts at tort reform to date. 
D. THE STATE OF MALPRACTICE REFORM 
In response to the perceived malpractice crisis, waves 
of statutory tort reform occurred during the mid-1970s and 
1980s.131 Much of the reform effort was led by physicians 
If anything went wrong, this alone could provide the "smoking gun" of 
evidence for a malpractice attorney. See Weiler, Medical Malpractice on 
Trial, supra note 7, at 86. Of course, the problem is more complicated, 
because custom is not always absolutely definable. There are a variety 
of acceptable approaches for many illnesses, reflecting inherent 
uncertainty. 
131 These reforms coincided with the peak points of the malpractice 
premium increase crisis. Weiler, A Measure of Malpractice, supra note 
92, at 7. 
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and organized medicine, who feel the economic, psychic and 
professional costs of the tort system. The views of many a 
physician are expressed in these words of a former dean of 
the Yale School of Medicine:132 
The quality of medical care today is threatened by the 
pervasive, unwelcome, crushing embrace of the law. Every 
participant in the health care system...is beset by an 
onslaught of new laws and regulations... Worst of all, 
because it is the most personal, physicians are forced to 
live with the spectre of malpractice litigation constantly 
in their mind's eye. This legal assault has occurred so 
swiftly and has been implemented so harshly that it has 
begun to erase some of the very attractions long associated 
with pursuing a medical career - autonomy, independence, 
approbation, inquiry. 
Early reforms focused on the litigation process 
itself,133 and attempted to reduce either the frequency of 
lawsuits or the severity of recovery.134 Efforts to reduce 
the filing of lawsuits included shortening the statute of 
Hubbard, supra note 104, at 344-45. 
133 Besides tort litigation reform, other reforms attempted to increase 
the availability of malpractice insurance. New sources of insurance 
were created (e.g., bedpan mutuals, joint underwriting association) and 
insurers were authorized to offer claims-made policies rather than 
occurrence policies. See Weiler, A Measure of Malpractice, supra note 
92, at 7. 
134 . 
For an overview of the various state malpractice tort reforms to 
date, see Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, U.S. Dep't of 
Health and Human Services, Compendium of Selected State Laws Governing 
Medical Injury Claims (1993) (reviewing the current status of tort 
reform laws in the fifty states); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment, Impact of Legal Reforms on Medical Malpractice Cases (1993); 
Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Reforms on the Value of Closed 
Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & 
L. 663 (1989). 

49 
limitations, regulating contingency fee arrangements between 
plaintiffs and their lawyers, eliminating joint and several 
liability, and requiring alternative means of dispute 
resolution.135 Meanwhile, other reforms attempted to limit 
the plaintiff's recovery by eliminating ad damnum clauses in 
pleadings,136 allowing for periodic payments of awards, 
modifying collateral source rules,137 and placing caps on 
damages (especially for pain and suffering) and attorney's 
r- 138 
fees. 
Although these statutory reforms have had varying 
degrees of success in stemming litigation, they attack the 
malpractice crisis narrowly and in piecemeal fashion. For 
the most part, they focus on erecting roadblocks to 
litigation and recovery instead of promoting quality care 
These can take the form of either pretrial screening panels or 
arbitration. Both devices typically use a panel composed of laypersons, 
lawyers, and physicians. Health Law, supra note 42,§ 9-2, at 342-43. 
136 These are clauses in the initial pleadings which state the total 
amount of money requested by the plaintiff, an amount that is typically 
inflated beyond the level of damages actually suffered. Id. at 341. 
137 Collateral source rules prevent the jury from learning about other 
sources of compensation available to the plaintiff (e.g., personal 
medical insurance). This rule arguably permits double recovery of 
damages. Id. 
138 For example, California has a $250,000 limit on recovery for non¬ 
economic damages (pain and suffering) while Indiana has a total $500,000 
cap per claim. Another proposal has been to schedule pain and suffering 
awards, rather than cap them, in order to narrow jury discretion. Id. 
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that could prevent litigation from happening in the first 
place. Other recent reform proposals, however, have been 
more comprehensive, seeking to do away entirely with the 
fault-based jury system. 
For example, the American Medical Association ("AMA") 
has sponsored a system similar to Workers' Compensation that 
would substitute an administrative Medical Board for the 
jury.139 Some legal tort scholars have suggested allowing 
private contract to allocate the risk of harm and 
compensation between providers and patients.140 Yet another 
proposal is a system of no-fault liability, where all 
iatrogenic injuries receive compensation regardless of 
negligence.141 
Perhaps the most interesting attempted reform was the 
State of Maine's Liability Demonstration Project ("Maine 
139 Report of the AMA/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project, A 
Proposed Alternative to the Civil Justice System for Resolving Medical 
Liability Disputes: A Fault-Based Administrative System (1987). This 
kind of proposal, if enacted, is likely to face constitutional challenge 
on the grounds that it violates the right to jury trial. See Hugh E. 
Reynolds et al., A Constitutional Analysis of the AMA's Medical 
Liability Project Proposal, 1 Courts, Health Science and the Law 58 
(1990) . 
140 The major scholarly pieces addressing this topic are Randall R. 
Bovbjerg & Clark C. Havighurst, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private 
Sector Find Relief?, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (1986); Richard A. 
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 American Bar 
Association Research Journal 87. 
141 See Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 132-58. 
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Project").142 In 1991, Maine passed legislation that 
immunized physicians from malpractice lawsuits if they 
practiced in accordance with certain practice guidelines. 
During the five-year duration of the Project, physicians who 
elected to participate were able to raise compliance with 
the guidelines as an affirmative defense to a lawsuit. The 
goal of the Project was to determine if malpractice premiums 
and the risk of lawsuits could be reduced by minimizing 
practice variation.143 
Each of the proposed reforms has relative strengths and 
weaknesses, and they will be discussed in greater detail 
later. But, like the current tort system, none of the 
suggested reforms fully harmonizes the liability system 
within the existing framework of managed care. As I will 
argue in Part V, managed care enterprise liability offers 
the best means for accomplishing the normative goals of a 
l 4 ? /— 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, % 2971 (West Supp. 1991) . The Maine 
Project established guidelines for the areas of emergency medicine, 
anesthesia, radiology, and obstetrics. These guidelines were developed 
by advisory committees in each of the practice areas. 
14 3. • 
The Maine Project had the legal effect of substituting written 
practice guidelines for custom as the standard of care, and was 
criticized on several grounds. See Edward Felsenthal, Cook Care: Maine 
Limits Liability for Doctors Who Meet Treatment Guidelines, Wall St. J., 
May 3, 1993, at A1; Robert H. Brook, Practice Guidelines and Practicing 
Medicine: Are They Compatible?, 262 JAMA 3027 (1989). 
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liability system (prevention, compensation, promotion of 
quality, and reduction of administrative expenses) because 
it treats cost reform and malpractice reform simultaneously 
and comprehensively. 
IV. LEGAL RATIONALE FOR MANAGED CARE ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
A. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
Enterprise liability for personal injury has its 
origins in products liability law.144 Traditional tort and 
contract law, based upon principles of individual fault and 
bargaining parity, reflected the norms of a pre-industrial 
era "dominated by small enterprises, individual merchants 
and independent craftsmen."145 The beginning of the 20th 
century heralded the rise of the national large-scale 
business enterprise. The mass production and distribution 
of products that was achievable shifted the balance of power 
Products liability law, in turn, had its origins in workers' 
compensation statutes. Workers' compensation had operated as a no-fault 
system for awarding recovery for employee accidents. Mandatory employer 
contributions to a recovery fund provided a strong incentive to predict 
and minimize accidents. For a comprehensive historical review of the 
development of enterprise liability law, see George L. Priest, The 
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 
(1985) . 
145 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom 
to Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 640 (1941). 
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between consumers and manufacturers:146 consumers often 
lacked the knowledge to evaluate the safety of products, and 
. . 14 7 
adhesion contracts gave sellers exploitative market power. 
The case for product enterprise liability was first 
made by legal academicians. Francis Bohlen proposed the 
benefit theory of liability, arguing that manufacturers 
which benefit from consumer purchases should internalize the 
costs of producing safe products or pay damages to victims 
of unsafe products.148 Fleming James took a slightly 
different approach, focusing instead on which party could 
best absorb the risk of product injury. He explained that 
tort law could be fashioned not only to shift a loss from 
one party to another, but also to distribute risk according 
to insurance principles:149 
Human failures in a machine age cause a large and 
fairly regular - though probably reducible - toll of life, 
146 See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The 
Revised Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 683 (1993) 
(arguing that product enterprise liability is based on imperfect 
consumer knowledge, manufacturer market power, and risk distribution 
efficiencies). 
147 
Adhesion contracts refer to standardized "take-it-or-leave-it" 
contracts containing boilerplate clauses limiting liability. Courts 
often refuse to enforce the strict terms of such contracts to address 
egregious inequalities in bargaining power. See Kessler, supra note 
145 . 
148 Priest, supra note 144, at 466. 
14 9 
Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of 
Liability Insurance, 51 Yale L.J. 549, 549-50 (1948). 
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limb, and property.... If a certain type of loss is the more 
or less inevitable byproduct of a desirable but dangerous 
form of activity it may well be just to distribute such 
losses among all the beneficiaries of the activity though it 
may be unjust to visit them severally upon those individuals 
who had happened to be the faultless instruments causing 
them. 
Starting in the 1930s, the courts and legislatures 
began to take notice of the academic theorists, and over 
several decades gradually reshaped the law to protect 
consumers. Warranty laws and the elimination of the privity 
of contract requirement150 eventually culminated in the 
judicial ratification of products liability law.151 
Manufacturers were now liable for injury to consumers or 
users even if their product was manufactured with all 
possible care, and even if the manufacturer did not directly 
sell the product to the ultimate user. 
The privity of contract requirement previously hindered tort and 
contract law reform. Mass production requires complex distribution 
systems, and these intermediate links shielded manufacturers from 
lawsuits under traditional liability theories. See Keeton et al., supra 
note 80,§ 99. 
151 The New Jersey Supreme Court made one of the first judicial 
declarations of enterprise liability when it held both Chrysler and a 
car dealership liable for injuries suffered by a car buyer's spouse due 
to a steering defect. Hennington v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 
69 (N.J. 1960); see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 
897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (Supreme Court of California reasoned that the 
purpose of imposing enterprise liability "is to insure that the costs of 
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the 
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by 
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves"). 
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Modern consumer law firmly embraces the concept of 
enterprise liability. Its universal adoption in the product 
injury context reflects important economic realities. 
First, the industrial corporate entity wields enormous power 
over product design, manufacturing, and marketing, and 
elaborate distribution networks make it difficult to 
identify the proper tortfeasor when injury occurs. Second, 
the enterprise can easily spread the risk of product 
injuries, both by purchasing insurance and by incorporating 
the costs of injuries into the price of the product. 
Finally, placing the burden of liability on the enterprise 
internalizes the cost of safety, providing a powerful 
financial incentive to invest in safety features, quality 
• • 152 
control procedures, and truthful advertising. 
These principles are also applicable to medical 
injuries. Modern health care takes place within the 
confines of complex integrated enterprises. Treatment 
decisions are influenced by a diffuse array of decision 
makers, many of whom neither have contact with individual 
See, e.g., Gary T. Schwarz, The Ethics and Economics of Tort 
Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 313 (1990); Christopher D. 
Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate 
Conduct, 90 Yale L.J. 1 (1980); Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise 




patients nor owe any traditional duty of care. Even the 
most sophisticated patients can hardly ever achieve true 
bargaining parity. Meanwhile, the MCO health plan is much 
better suited to manage the risks of treatment and to 
distribute the costs of injuries. The extension of 
enterprise liability to managed care would logically follow 
not only from these principles, but also from well- 
established legal precedent in the health care context. 
B. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN THE HEALTH CARE CONTEXT 
Prior to 1940, most hospitals and other institutional 
providers were insulated from medical malpractice liability. 
Non-profit hospitals were protected by the "charitable 
immunity" doctrine - patients who accepted charitable 
benefits were deemed to have impleidly waived any possible 
negligence claims.153 Government-owned hospitals enjoyed 
sovereign immunity.154 Even for-profit hospitals were exempt 
The case establishing hospital charitable immunity was McDonald v. 
Massachusetts General Hosp., 120 Mass 432 (1876). The court reasoned 
that public and . private donations supporting a charitable hospital 
constituted a trust fund which should not be diverted by malpractice 
lawsuits. See also Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 
92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("It is said that one who accepts the benefit of a 
charity enters into a relation which exempts one's benefactor from 
liability for the negligence of his servants in administering the 
charity"). 
154 See Health Law, supra note 42,§ 7-1, at 2 91. 
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from physician negligence under the "independent contractor" 
doctrine, which viewed physicians not as employees, but as 
independent contractors who, although operating within the 
hospital, retained full decision making autonomy.155 
As hospitals assumed an increasingly dominant role in 
the provision of health care, courts became less willing to 
shield them from lawsuits.156 The 1957 case of Bing v. 
157 
Thunig was a watershed event in the decline of the 
charitable immunity doctrine. As noted by the Bing court, 
the ready availability of liability insurance made it less 
likely that damage awards would devastate the assets of a 
charitable institution. The rule of charitable immunity has 
now been completely eliminated by the majority of states, 
although it retains limited scope and applicability in a 
minority of jurisdictions.158 
See, e.g., Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. 
156 See Elam v. College Park Hospital, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 163 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1982) (court argued that the modern hospital is "a multi-faceted, 
health care facility responsible for the quality of medical care and 
treatment rendered.... the patient treated in such a facility receives 
care from a number of individuals of varying capacities and is not 
merely treated by a physician acting in isolation"). 
143 N.E. 2d 3 (N.Y. 1957) . See also President and Directors of 
Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
158 
See generally Janet F. Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity of Non- 
Governmental Charities - Modern Status, 25 A.L.R.4th 517, 525-46 (1983) 
(finding that a minority of states retain partial charitable immunity to 
the extent of statutory ceilings on recoverable damages or only as to 
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With the decline of charitable immunity, the most 
significant remaining obstacle to hospital liability was the 
notion that hospitals do not themselves provide medical 
care, but rather administer the equipment and facilities by 
which doctors, nurses, and others provide such care. 
Although hospitals could be directly liable for their own 
negligent administrative actions, they were not responsible 
for the medical actions of their physicians. Courts often 
struggled to draw the line between inherently medical as 
opposed to administrative activities: giving unneeded blood 
transfusions to the wrong patient was labeled an 
"administrative" error, but giving the wrong blood to the 
15 9 
right patient was a "medical" error. 
Slowly, however, courts removed this distinction by 
finding hospitals vicariously liable, under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, for the negligence of their employed 
physicians.160 Vicarious liability is the principle of 
charitable care). Sovereign immunity has proved more resilient to 
elimination than charitable immunity. Sovereign immunity is held by the 
government acting in its sovereign capacity. State courts have widely 
split on the issue, with some eliminating it, others leaving it to the 
legislatures, and others retaining immunity in various forms. See 
Health Law, supra note 42,§ 7-1, at 291. 
1 c: q 
See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 4-5. 
160 See, e.g., Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) ("It is a non sequitur to conclude that because a 
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agency law that imposes liability on one person for the 
actionable conduct of another, based solely on a 
relationship between the two persons.161 Later, the 
vicarious liability of hospitals was extended to cover non- 
employed physicians, such as radiologists and 
162 
anesthesiologists, under the ostensible agency doctrine. 
In contrast to hospitals, health care insurance plans 
have largely managed to retain immunity from physician 
malpractice liability. Under state statutes and common law 
rules proscribing the corporate practice of medicine,163 lay 
entities like insurance companies are presumed to be 
incapable of exercising control over medical professionals. 
Instead, insurers are regulated by a separate family of 
hospital cannot practice medicine it cannot be liable for the actions of 
its employed agents and servants who may be so licensed"). 
161 See Black's Law Dictionary 1566 (6th ed. 1990) . 
162 See infra note 176-182 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
ostensible agency doctrine. Excellent scholarly treatments outlining 
the shifting allocation of hospital liability are Diane Janulis & Alan 
Hornstein, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Hospital's Liability 
for Physicians' Malpractice, 64 Neb. L. Rev. 689 (1985); Arthur 
Southwick, Hospital Liability: Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. Legal 
Med. 1 (1983) . 
163 
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine prohibits corporations 
from engaging in the practice of medicine. The doctrine has been 
severely criticized for inhibiting innovative health care organization 
and cost control. Its continuing status seems very much in doubt, 
especially in light of current trends in the medical marketplace. See 
Health Law, supra note 42,§ 5-10, at 183. See also supra notes 27 and 
42 and accompanying text. 
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legal doctrines that impose procedural obligations 
concerning coverage disputes. For example, third-party 
payors must adjudicate claims for benefits in good faith or 
risk liability for unfair dealing and bad-faith breach of 
contract.164 
The present lack of meaningful malpractice liability on 
the part of insurers stems from the historical distinction 
between insurance behavior and clinical care. Under managed 
care, however, this distinction is specious because a clear 
separation between the insurance function and the clinical 
function no longer exists. MCOs make financial and coverage 
decisions that directly and indirectly influence the 
practice of medicine. Courts are only just beginning to 
find bases of malpractice liability against MCOs, often 
analogizing from hospital liability principles. 
Before discussing the bases of managed care liability, 
it is worth noting that an incomplete version of enterprise 
liability has existed since the 1970s in the form of 
"channeling" arrangements.165 A number of integrated health 
164 See generally John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice §§ 8877-8879 (1981) . 
165 See generally Ann P. Wood, Channeling: Medical Liability Insurance 
Concept Being Widely Discussed by Hospitals, Pediatric News, Jan. 1987, 
at 10; Myron F. Stevens, Jr., A Proposal to Improve the Cost to Benefit 
Relationships in the Medical Professional Liability Insurance System, 
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care enterprises, including the Federation of Jewish 
Philanthropies in New York and the Harvard Medical 
Institutions in Boston, offer their affiliated physicians 
the option of joining the institution's insurance policy.166 
If a lawsuit arises, the individual physician still remains 
directly liable for malpractice, but both the institution 
and physician are covered by one insurer, with claims 
jointly defended by a single defense team. 
Channeling programs have not been studied thoroughly, 
but anecdotal evidence suggests that these programs may 
reduce liability costs and improve cooperation between 
physicians and hospitals. Channeling is a step in the 
right direction toward full-scale enterprise liability, but 
it remains incomplete because liability for medical 
16 8 
malpractice is not exclusively borne by the enterprise. 
1975 Duke L.J. 1305, 1324-31 (1975) (proposing a shift of malpractice 
liability exposure to institutional providers). 
166 See New York State Insurance Dep't., A Balanced Prescription for 
Change: Report on the New York State Insurance Department on Medical 
Malpractice 18 (1988); Harvard Affiliated Medical Institutions, 
Malpractice Insurance Program Information Booklet 1993-1994 at 1 (1993) 
(the Harvard program includes approximately 6,400 physicians). 
167 See Sage et al. , supra note 14, at 17-18. 
168 Programs similar to channeling are the voluntary assumption of 
malpractice liability by government health systems, such as the Public 
Health Service, the Department of Defense, the Veterans Administration, 
the Indian Health Services and the Bureau of Prisons. For these 
entities, assuming liability simplifies the dispute resolution process 
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The next section highlights several of the legal theories by 
which malpractice liability may be extended to managed care. 
C. THEORIES OF LIABILITY APPLICABLE TO MANAGED CARE 
As participation in managed care has greatly increased 
in recent years, there has been a corresponding, though less 
dramatic, growth in litigation against MCOs. A few states 
initially granted MCOs statutory immunity from tort 
liability, but most now permit courts to consider common law 
claims against MCOs.169 A broad spectrum of liability 
theories, sounding in both tort and contract law, have been 
asserted against MCOs. 
The initial approach taken by plaintiffs and courts has 
been to extend by analogy the same theories of malpractice 
liability formerly applied against hospitals to MCOs. In 
and encourages physicians to participate in the quality-improving 
efforts of the entire enterprise. Id. at 18. 
169 For example, until 1988, Illinois provided that an HMO could not be 
liable for the malpractice of a member physician. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 
32, para. 620 (Smith-Hurd 1970). See also N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 26:2J-25 
(West 1987) (in Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that although New Jersey's HMO Act grants immunity to 
certain HMO employees, it does not confer immunity on the HMO itself). 
But Texas still shields HMOs from direct liability for physician 
malpractice under the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. See 
Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) 
(court referred to provision in Texas HMO Act prohibiting HMOs from 




test in determining the existence of an employment 
relationship is whether the "employer" controls or has the 
172 
right to control the work performed by the "employee." 
The label of the relationship given by the parties is not 
dispositive - even if the contract between an MCO and a 
physician states otherwise, employment status may be 
inferred as a matter of law if the MCO maintains sufficient 
173 
control over the physician's work. 
Because staff model HMOs174 directly employ physicians 
as salaried providers and own the working facilities, they 
are the form of MCO most susceptible to claims based on the 
respondeat superior doctrine. But other forms of MCOs 
Factors used in determining the existence of control include: (1) the 
manner of physician selection and engagement; (2) the degree of 
discretion and oversight over the physician's performance; (3) the 
custom in the industry; (4) the skill of the physician; (5) the method 
of payment; (6) the right of discharge; and (7) the ownership of 
facilities or instrumentalities used to perform the work. See generally 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1984); Stewart v. Midani, 525 
F.Supp. 843, 849 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (court considered eight factors in 
determining existence of employment relationship). 
173 See Keller v. Missouri Baptist Hosp., 800 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. App. 1990); 
Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) 
(despite contract terms stipulating that emergency room physician was an 
independent contractor, hospital could be held liable under respondeat 
superior doctrine if it exercised sufficient control over the 
physician). 
174 • 
See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. 
175 See Sloan, 516 N.E.2d at 1109; Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation Health 
Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (a staff model HMO was held 
vicariously liable under respondeat superior for the negligence of an 
independent consulting cardiologist; although Kaiser did not select nor 
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(e.g., PPOs and IPA model HMOs) may also be subject to 
respondeat superior claims, depending on the degree of 
control exerted over providers. Certain indicia of control, 
such as capitation, utilization review, practice parameters, 
and provider selection and discharge, may satisfy the 
presence of a quasi-employment relationship. 
In cases where respondeat superior may be inapplicable, 
another theory by which to find MCOs vicariously liable for 
physician negligence is ostensible agency. The ostensible 
agency theory examines the patient's expectations regarding 
treatment, and asks whether the health care organization 
created the appearance of an agency relationship between 
itself and the negligent physician. Two factors are central 
to this analysis: (1) whether the patient looks to the 
institution rather than the individual physician for health 
compensate the cardiologist for his consultation, the court found that 
Kaiser had the ability to control the cardiologist's work since he 
answered directly to Kaiser's primary care physician who had consulted 
him) . 
176 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 (1965) ("one who employs an 
independent contractor to perform services for another which are 
accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered 
by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such 
services, to the same extent as though the employer were supplying them 
himself or by his servants"). 
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care, and (2) whether the institution "holds out" the 
. . . 177 
physician as its agent. 
Establishing these factors is often an expensive, fact¬ 
intensive inquiry. The MCO's advertising and marketing 
efforts can be crucial pieces of evidence in determining 
whether the MCO created a reasonable presumption in the eyes 
of the patient that the physician was an agent of the MCO. 
In one case, for example, a Michigan HMO patient had to have 
an arm amputated after misdiagnosis by a consulting 
radiologist. The HMO was liable for malpractice because it 
promised plan members "complete health care services." On 
the other hand, an Illinois HMO was able to avoid ostensible 
agency liability, in part, by specifically informing 
patients that it does not provide medical services. 
See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1986) (because 
hospital failed to emphasize that its emergency room physicians were not 
employees, it had a non-delegable duty to provide non-negligent 
emergency room care); Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1985) 
(ostensible agency applied where hospital advertised itself as a 
provider of quality medical care). 
i 7 o 
Decker v. Saini, No. 88-361768 NH, 1991 WL 277590, 4 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 
Sept. 17, 1991) (as a matter of public policy, the court noted that 
"imposing vicarious liability on HMOs for the malpractice of their 
member physicians would strongly encourage them to select physicians 
with the best credentials"). 
i TO 
Raglin v. HMO Illinois, 595 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992). 
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Because the status of a physician as an independent 
contractor or employee is irrelevant in determining 
liability, ostensible agency may apply to all forms of 
MCOs.180 In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,181 an IPA 
model HMO was liable under ostensible agency theory when a 
physician performing a breast biopsy punctured the chest 
wall of the plaintiff's wife, resulting in her death. The 
Boyd court noted several factors justifying the appearance 
of an agency relationship: (1) the HMO's advertising and 
marketing presented the HMO as "a total care program;" (2) 
the patient's contractual relationship was with the HMO and 
not the physician; (3) the patient had a limited choice of 
physicians; (4) the physicians were subject to the HMO's 
182 
cost and quality control programs. 
A closely related theory of vicarious liability is "agency by 
estoppel," which requires that actual detrimental reliance be shown. 
See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1984) ("one who represents 
that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third 
person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent 
is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack 
of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as 
if he were such") . 
1 ft 1 
547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). But cf. Raglin, 595 N.E.2d at 
154 (a limited list of providers was not dispositive as to ostensible 
agency theory because "this is the manner in which all HMOs operate"). 
182 
Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1235. 
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b. Direct Negligence Liability 
In addition to vicarious liability for physician 
malpractice, MCOs may face direct liability for injuries to 
patients. MCOs can be directly negligent either in the 
selection and control of their physicians, or in the design 
and implementation of their cost-containment mechanisms. 
The doctrine of corporate negligence first emerged in 
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, in 
which the plaintiff's leg had to be amputated after 
negligent orthopedic surgery was performed by an unqualified 
emergency room physician. The Darling court found the 
hospital directly liable for failure to credential 
physicians properly in the performance of orthopedic 
surgery, and thereby established a hospital's duty of care 
184 
to use only qualified and competent physicians. 
Darling led to a series of decisions expanding the 
duties a hospital owes directly to patients. Hospitals now 
owe independent duties to exercise reasonable care in the 
selection, retention, supervision and monitoring of their 
211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert, denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). 
184 
Id. at 258. 

69 
medical staffs.185 The corporate negligence theory has been 
further extended to MCOs, especially in the area of provider 
selection and retention. Because most MCOs restrict a 
patient's choice to a limited pool of providers, plaintiffs 
have alleged that an MCO has a duty to review and 
investigate the credentials of its physicians properly. An 
MCO may be liable for physician malpractice if it failed to 
186 
credential and select the physician appropriately. 
The other component of the corporate negligence 
doctrine is the duty to supervise the quality of medical 
care rendered by staff physicians. A hospital may be liable 
for negligent supervision or monitoring if it fails to 
detect physician negligence or take steps to correct 
potential problems. Although there have been no published 
185 
See Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (hospital owes duty to adequately 
monitor medical staff physicians); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 
(Wash. 1984) (hospital has duty to monitor and control physicians who 
are treating patients within hospital); Johnson v. Misericordia 
Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981) (hospital owes duty to 
investigate qualifications of medical staff adequately); Bost v. Riley, 
262 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 1980) (hospital has duty to monitor and oversee 
patient treatment). 
186 See William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed 
Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26 Tort & Ins. L.J. 451, 470-71 
(1991); McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization, 604 A.2d 1053, 
1059-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Harrell v. Total Health Care, 1989 WL 
153066 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 
1989) (en banc). Beyond a common law duty to investigate the 
credentials of physicians, federal and state regulations require some 
level of provider credentialing as a condition of qualification and 
licensure. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R.§ 417.107(i) (1989). 
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opinions imputing similar liability to MCOs, they are 
already subject to federal and state quality assurance 
regulations. As courts increasingly characterize MCOs as 
health care providers, and the collection of quality 
assurance data become more available, suits against MCOs for 
negligent physician supervision and control are likely to 
surface. 
A separate category of direct liability for MCOs 
concerns their cost-containment mechanisms, such as 
utilization review. In accordance with utilization review 
procedures, MCOs may refuse to authorize certain treatments 
that are medically "unnecessary." If in hindsight, such 
denial of treatment results in injury to the patient, the 
MCO may be liable on grounds of negligent interference with 
the health-care decision making process. The case of 
Wickline v. State of California was the first to address 
the potential liability of a third-party payor, such as an 
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.§ 300(e) (c)(6) (1988); Cal. Health & Safety Code, 
§§ 1351(m), 1367(b), 1370, 1380 (Deering 1992); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 
550.53(5) (West Supp. 1992). 
18 8 
Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 34, at 325. 
189 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
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MCO, for injuries resulting from utilization review 
decisions. 
The plaintiff in Wickline was covered under Medi-Cal, 
California's medical assistance program for indigents. 
Diagnosed with Leriche's syndrome, the plaintiff entered 
the hospital for vascular surgery; Medi-Cal, employing a 
prospective utilization review process, authorized a ten-day 
hospital stay. After post - surgical complications arose, the 
plaintiff's surgeon requested an eight-day hospital 
extension, but was given authorization for only four 
additional days. Without appealing the decision, the 
surgeon discharged the plaintiff after the four-day 
extension expired. Several days later, the plaintiff's 
situation deteriorated to the point where her leg had to be 
amputated. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that 
Medi-Cal's negligent administration of utilization review 
caused her premature discharge, resulting in her 
. . . 191 
amputation. 
Leriche's syndrome is a condition due to vasoocclusive disease of the 
aortoiliac segment. The classic symptoms include impotence, buttock 
atrophy, and claudication. Peter F. Lawrence, Essentials of General 
Surgery 333 (1992) . 
191 
Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 811-17. 
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The actual holding of the Wickline court found Medi-Cal 
not liable, primarily because the plaintiff's surgeon 
complied with the four-day extension without filing a second 
request for additional days. However, Wickline has 
significance not so much for its holding, as for its 
j . . 192 
dicta: 
The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed 
when care which should have been provided is not provided 
should recover for the injuries suffered from all those 
responsible for the deprivation of such care, including, 
when appropriate, health care payors. Third party payors of 
health services can be legally accountable when medically 
inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or 
implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for 
example, when appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical 
or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably 
disregarded or overridden. 
Thus, Wickline leaves the door open to claims against 
MCOs for injuries resulting from negligent utilization 
review. Future plaintiffs may extend Wickline's invitation 
beyond utilization review, by asserting claims based on the 
financial incentive and risk-sharing devices of MCOs.193 In 
id. at 819. 
193 , 
Very few published cases currently exist concerning MCO liability for 
injuries caused by negligent cost-containment strategies. But see 
Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1990); Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767 NM-2, slip op. (Mich. Cir. 
Ct., Saginaw County Apr. 27, 1989) (one of the few cases where an HMO's 
financial incentives were alleged to have caused physician malpractice) . 
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the meantime, however, the physician is caught in a Hobson's 
choice dilemma as explained by the California Medical 
• . 194 
Association's amicus curiae brief in Wickline: 
The patient who is injured when care which should have 
been provided is not provided will recover from someone. If 
the third-party payor imposing these controls is permitted 
to avoid liability by maintaining the fiction that the 
mechanisms have only fiscal consequences, so that patient 
care is solely the physician's responsibility, the physician 
becomes the insurer. If rationing malfunctions, the 
physician who complies with the program is liable to the 
patient. If the physician does not comply, the physician is 
punished or faces responsibility for incurring authorized 
costs. 
2. Theories of Contract Liability 
Tort theories based on negligence are the most often 
used causes of action in malpractice suits. Yet, other 
potential bases of recovery exist, most notably theories of 
contract liability. Because the relationship between an MCO 
and its subscribers arises out of contract, contract 
theories may be asserted in addition to, or as an 
alternative to tort-based theories, particularly when case- 
specific proof problems or legal defenses may preclude 
negligence-based claims. These contract-based theories of 
194 
Chittenden, supra note 186, at 480. 
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malpractice include breach of contract, breach of warranty, 
19 5 
bad faith in the handling of claims, and fraud. 
A breach of contract claim was brought against both a 
primary-care physician and IPA model HMO in Williams v. 
HealthAmerica. In her contract action, the plaintiff 
alleged that she suffered injuries from a delay in referring 
her to a specialist. The basis of her claim was that the 
HMO breached its contract by failing to deliver health 
benefits as promised (i.e., the right to be referred to a 
specialist in a timely fashion). 
In general, health care providers are not held to 
guarantee cures or good results. But many MCOs, in their 
marketing and advertising materials, purport to assure high 
quality care. Representations of quality may be interpreted 
by courts and juries as promising that certain standards of 
care will be met, and may provide the basis for a breach of 
The liability claims of bad faith and fraud are not contract claims 
per se, but rather tort claims that arise out of contractual 
obligations. Under either theory, plaintiffs can recover both 
compensatory (actual) and punitive damages in excess of policy 
obligations. See Health Law, supra note 42,§ 11-3, at 507-08. 
196 535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (the court upheld the breach of 
contract action against the physician, but recharacterized the action 
against the HMO as a tort claim for bad faith in the handling of 
claims). See also Yunker v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 611 P.2d 314 
(Or. Ct. App. 1980). 
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warranty claim. Such assurances, however, must be 
distinguished from "mere puffery," which would not rise to 
the level of a warranty.197 
An MCO may be liable for bad faith in the processing of 
claims. To establish bad faith, a plaintiff must prove that 
the MCO acted egregiously in wrongfully denying coverage or 
delaying payment of a claim.198 In the dramatic case of Fox 
v. Health Net of California, the HMO refused to pay for a 
costly bone-marrow transplant to treat advanced breast 
cancer, alleging that the procedure was too "experimental." 
Deciding that the HMO acted in bad faith in breaching its 
contract, the jury awarded the plaintiff's estate a stunning 
$12 million in compensatory damages, and $77 million in 
punitive damages.200 
See, e.g., Pulvers v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 
392, 393 (1979) (a breach of warranty claim was rejected on grounds that 
alleged warranty of good result was no more than "generalized puffing to 
the extent that the [HMO] doctors would exercise good judgment in their 
care"). But see Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1235-36 (court found factual issue as 
to "whether the literature in which HMO 'guaranteed' and 'assured' the 
quality of care to its subscribers, had been distributed to .... [the 
plaintiff]"). 
198 See Health Law, supra note 42,§ 11-3, at 508. 
199 3 BNA Health Law Rptr. 18 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec 23, 1993) . 
200 In finding bad faith, the Fox jury heard testimony that the HMO's 
decision was made to save money for the organization, over the 
opposition of the HMO's own physicians. See Ellen Pollock, HMO Held 
Liable for Refusing Coverage, Wall St. J. , Dec. 28, 1993, at B5. 
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Claims based upon common law fraud or state consumer 
fraud statutes are yet another conceivable avenue for 
recovery. Assertions in MCO contracts and marketing 
brochures, or omissions of material information from these 
documents, that induce the patient to subscribe may be 
actionable in fraud. For example, in Teti v. U.S. 
Healthcare,201 the plaintiffs brought suit in federal court 
alleging fraud and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. They 
complained that the HMO's failure to disclose its physician 
compensation arrangements, which included financial 
incentives to minimize the use of medical services, induced 
2 03 
their enrollment in the HMO. 
3. Potential Hurdle of ERISA Preemption 
An important potential barrier to MCO malpractice 
liability is preemption by the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 204 ERISA is a comprehensive 
201 1989 WL 143274 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd 904 F.2d 696 (3d. Cir. 1990). 
202 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73§ 201 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1990) . 
203 The case was ultimately dismissed for lack of federal court 
jurisdiction, and no other case to date has recognized a duty to 
disclose cost-containment incentives. 
204 
29 U.S.C.§§ 1001-1461 (1994). 
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federal statute designed to regulate employee benefit plans. 
It sets minimum uniform standards and provides for uniform 
remedies in the enforcement of the plans. Health insurance 
benefits have long been a form of employee compensation, and 
in many instances, an MCO is sponsored by an employer 
through a self-funded benefit plan. 
Congress explicitly provided that ERISA preempts state 
laws to the extent that they "relate to" employee benefit 
plans not otherwise exempt from federal regulation. The 
preemptive provision was intended to establish pension plan 
law as an exclusively federal concern. The issue with 
respect to MCO malpractice liability is whether such state 
claims "relate to" the benefit plan, and are thereby 
preempted by ERISA. The Supreme Court has concluded that 
a state law "relates to" a benefit plan if it has a 
connection with or reference to such a plan; yet, the 
29 U.s.c.s 1144 (1994). 
206 The possibility of ERISA preemption is significant because plaintiffs 
would then be limited to the much more restricted remedies provided by 
ERISA. In general, extracontractual and punitive damages are not 
recoverable under ERISA. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985). Also, plaintiffs are not entitled to 
jury trial under ERISA and must pursue their claims in federal court. 
See Brown v. Retirement Committee of Briggs & Stratton, 797 F.2d 521, 
528-30 (7th Cir. 1986) . 
207 Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (state 
common law claims for bad faith, intentional infliction of emotional 
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Court has also noted that "some state actions may affect 
employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or peripheral 
a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the 
-i ..208 
plan. " 
A broad discussion of ERISA preemption is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but the evolving trend in the federal 
courts is that state law vicarious liability claims against 
MCOs are not preempted by ERISA. 209 However, courts have 
been more willing to apply ERISA preemption to direct 
liability claims (i.e., claims based on corporate negligence 
or the negligent administration of utilization review). The 
general reasoning behind ERISA preemption in these instances 
is that direct liability claims "relate to" an MCO benefit 
distress, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and fraud 
relating to denial of plan benefits were preempted). 
208 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983). 
209 See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(ERISA did not preempt vicarious liability claims based on ostensible 
agency theory because they were claims about the low quality of benefits 
received, rather than claims to recover benefits due or to enforce or 
clarify plan benefits); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(vicarious liability claim of respondeat superior not preempted by 
ERISA); Elsesser v. Hospital of Phil. College of Osteopathic Medicine, 
795 F.Supp. 142 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (claims of negligence, misrepresentation 
and breach of contract were not preempted), vacated 802 F.Supp. 1286 
(E.D. Pa. 1992). 
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plan because they concern the manner by which the MCO 
administers or provides the plan's benefits.210 
4. Summary of Managed Care Liability 
Despite the failure of the Clinton Plan to mandate 
enterprise liability, the further judicial development of 
MCO liability seems inevitable. Changing public attitudes 
toward the contemporary health care marketplace will make it 
easier for courts throughout the country to further extend 
analogous hospital liability principles to MCOs. Whether 
brought under theories of tort or contract, the variety of 
potential malpractice claims against MCOs is matched only by 
the structural variety of the organizations themselves. 
Unfortunately, the sheer variety of liability theories 
only underscores the lack of a systematic approach to 
managed care liability. Nowhere is there a system of "true" 
enterprise liability, where malpractice liability would be 
See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'1 Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 
1993) (malpractice claim against HMO for refusal to precertify payment 
for heart surgery related to the administration of benefits, and was 
therefore preempted); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (malpractice claim against HMO's utilization review for 
wrongful decision that hospitalization was not necessary involved a 
benefit determination, resulting in preemption), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 
1033 (1992); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F.Supp. 61 (D. 
Conn. 1990) (ERISA preempts direct claim for negligent supervision and 




borne exclusively by the health care enterprise on behalf of 
its affiliated physicians. So long as physicians remain 
independently liable for malpractice, the inherent tensions 
between the tort system and cost reform will continue to 
exist. 
As a matter of public policy, the uniform adoption of 
"true" enterprise liability is desirable in several 
important respects. First, it would lend predictability to 
the dispute process by eliminating the confusion in the 
courts as to what doctrine to apply in malpractice cases. 
Even though theories of MCO liability are expanding, they 
are creatures of state law whose applicability now differs 
widely from state to state. Second, compared to the present 
tort system, enterprise liability would better accomplish 
the normative goals of a liability system in light of 
managed care cost containment. 
V. ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY RATIONALE FOR MANAGED CARE 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
A. THE NORMATIVE GOALS OF A LIABILITY SYSTEM 
The crucial public policy issue is whether enterprise 
liability would be an improvement over traditional 
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malpractice law, or any other tort reform. The answer 
depends on the criteria used to evaluate a liability system. 
An often-stated justification for tort liability is the 
value of corrective justice. This value is a statement of 
moral culpability, requiring that "wrongs" committed by 
negligent physicians be corrected through payments to 
innocent patients. In fact, the current malpractice system 
serves this value only in a remote fashion. 
Malpractice lawsuits against physicians are not paid 
for by the individual physician, but by the physician's 
insurer.211 The insurer collects malpractice premiums from 
physicians who finance these overhead costs through the 
treatment fees charged to patients. Patients, in turn, pay 
for physician fees by acquiring insurance either directly or 
through their employers or the government. Thus, the tort 
system functions within an elaborate, circular system of 
insurance that essentially requires all potential patients 
to insure against the risk of negligently-caused injury. On 
this view, the primary challenge of a liability system is 
not to achieve corrective justice per se, but to offer the 
211 Furthermore, the premiums paid by physicians typically do not reflect 
their individual claims experience, but are based on the claims 
experience of a group similar specialists in the same locality. See 
supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text. 
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fairest and most efficient form of insurance to patients 
injured by malpractice.212 
Guido Calabresi, former Dean of Yale Law School, argues 
that the economic aim of accident law is to reduce the sum 
of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding 
accidents."13 To this end, he identifies three normative 
goals of an ideal liability system: (1) compensation of 
injured victims, (2) prevention of accidents, and (3) 
minimization of administrative expenses.214 In the context 
of medical malpractice liability, I would add a fourth goal: 
the promotion of quality health care. With this general 
framework in mind, enterprise liability will first be 
compared to the present tort system, and then to alternative 
models of liability. 
212See Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 44-47. 
Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis (1970). 
214 Id. See also Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 
(1987); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Tort Law (1987). 
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B. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY COMPARED TO THE PRESENT TORT 
SYSTEM 
As discussed in Section III, the current system does a 
. 215 
poor job compensating the victims of malpractice. 
Enterprise liability would replace the individual physician 
with a much larger "deep pocketed" defendant, and perhaps 
encourage a greater number of lawsuits. But because 
enterprise liability would still require that fault be shown 
- that is, a plaintiff would still have to prove that a 
physician or the MCO itself was negligent - it is uncertain 
whether more victims would receive compensation, or whether 
awards would be more predictably and fairly distributed. 
Many of the same hurdles to patient compensation (e.g., 
attorney reluctance to accept small-recovery cases, 
imperfect information as to the cause of patient injury, 
inherent uncertainties in the dispute process) would still 
exist under enterprise liability. 
Compared to the present system, enterprise liability 
would almost certainly reduce many of the administrative 
costs associated with medical malpractice. Enterprise 
215 
See supra notes 108-117 and accompanying text. 
216 It has been estimated that only about 40 percent of the total amount 
expended in the malpractice claims process actually reaches injured 
patients as compensation for their injuries. On the other hand, the 
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liability would reduce litigation costs by substituting a 
single defendant for multiple, individual defendants. Any 
case with multiple defendants is more complicated, time 
consuming, and expensive because of the problems in 
. 217 
reconciling the differing interests of the parties. 
Enterprise liability would also achieve efficiencies in the 
pricing of malpractice insurance. A large MCO can obtain 
insurance to reflect the claims experience of a group of 
affiliated physicians across all medical specialties, and 
thereby spread the costs of insurance over this larger risk 
pool. Moreover, enterprise liability would reduce the 
costs of defensive medicine, estimated to be $10-15 billion 
219 
per year. 
The greatest advantage of enterprise liability over the 
current system is with respect to the goals of injury 
Workers' Compensation program is estimated to expend only 20 percent of 
its claims dollar on administrative expenses, roughly one-third the 
proportion spent in medical malpractice. See Weiler et al. , A Measure 
of Malpractice, supra note 92, at 29. 
Nearly 25 percent of malpractice claims now have two or more 
defendants. See Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 
127 . 
218 • 
See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. 
219 See supra note 9. Additional social costs of the existing system 
include the refusal of physicians to practice in certain high-risk 
specialties and the lost services of physicians who must devote 
uncompensated days to defend against a malpractice claim. See Weiler, 
Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 80-90. 
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prevention and quality promotion. Enterprise liability has 
the ability to reconcile the seemingly contradictory 
objectives of cost control and quality because it forces the 
MCO to internalize the consequences of its cost-containment 
efforts.220 As patients increasingly look to institutions 
rather than individual practitioners for care, enterprise 
liability is consistent with the idea that these 
institutions are "ultimately responsible for arranging, 
providing, and coordinating the activities of a host of 
professional persons, all of whom must work together in the 
care of patients."221 
Supporters of the current system have argued that 
enterprise liability would weaken the tort system's 
preventive role because physicians would no longer have to 
fear the possibility of a malpractice lawsuit. Physicians 
do tend to overestimate the risk of being sued, and the 
sheer unpleasantness of litigation no doubt deters to some 
MCOs should be efficient quality managers because they are better 
able than individual physicians to assess the quality of care they 
deliver in the aggregate, and have the financial resources to invest in 
information technologies. Continuous quality management requires 
training physicians, comparing the effectiveness of medical procedures, 
and developing practice guidelines that embody empirical data. See 
supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of these and 
other injury prevention and quality management techniques. 
221 




extent. I would argue, however, that the main safeguards 
against physician carelessness are strong professional 
ethics and concern over reputation, not the threat of a 
malpractice lawsuit. 
These strong personal incentives will continue to exist 
under enterprise liability. Injured patients could still 
exact enormous costs on the physician - income, stress, 
damage to reputation - by litigation undertaken to establish 
the fault of the physician in order to recover from the MCO. 
Physicians who demonstrated a systematic pattern of 
negligence could be disciplined and even terminated by the 
MCO. Rather than weakening the preventive incentives of the 
current system, enterprise liability preserves them because 
it still requires that physician negligence be shown. 
Many physicians fear that a move toward enterprise 
liability will erode their autonomy, and reduce their status 
from independent professionals to mere employees. Some 
prefer to retain individual liability for negligence rather 
than cede any further control over the standards of 
222 • • 
However, the presence of malpractice insurance and the random nature 
of malpractice lawsuits attenuate the deterrence ability of tort law. 
Most malpractice suits arise in connection with momentary lapses of 
attention that are hardly influenced by the threat that an adverse 





treatment to MCOs. As a future physician, I am 
sympathetic to these objections, but I believe they 
contemplate a health care world that has long since passed. 
The reality is that a host of actors besides MCOs 
already challenge the discretion of physicians. The courts, 
lay juries, hospital administrators, and government 
• • • • 224 
regulators all regularly exercise significant influence. 
In the integrated health networks of the present and future, 
physicians must function as members of teams, but their role 
on the team will always be a central one. The very nature 
of clinical variability assures that physicians will retain 
a large degree of professional judgment; the difference now 
is that their control over medical resources is not 
exclusive, but shared. 
Richard Corlin, M.D., expressed the AMA's House of Delegates position 
toward enterprise liability: "One proposal Clinton's made that is 
absolutely nonnegotiable is enterprise liability, which means that if 
you work for an HMO and get sued, you could get fired. This will lead 
to a firestorm like nothing they've ever seen. If they want a doctor 
strike, this is the best way to do it." On Che Road Again: Media Tour 
Pushes AMA Reform Message, Am. Med. News, May 17, 1993, at 1, 7. 
224 . . , 
For instance, the National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB"), a 
registry of malpractice judgments and disciplinary actions, was 
established by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, and 
effective 1990. The goal of the NPDB was to stimulate the peer review 
process on the part of health care institutions. See generally Susan L. 
Horner, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, 




C. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY COMPARED TO ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS 
Besides enterprise liability, a number of other models 
of comprehensive tort reform have been suggested: (1) the 
AMA's administrative fault proposal, (2) contract law as a 
replacement for tort law, and (3) a no-fault liability 
system similar to Workers' Compensation. Using the same 
framework of analysis, these proposals will now be compared 
to enterprise liability. 
The essence of the AMA's proposal is to move 
malpractice cases away from juries and into a forum that 
would permit a more informed professional appraisal. This 
proposal may achieve better and more timely compensation, 
especially for small claims, and may also reduce the 
administrative costs of litigation. However, it may not 
achieve efficiencies with respect to malpractice insurance 
pricing, and more importantly, would seem to do little to 
enhance injury prevention. Switching the forum from a jury 
to a Medical Board does not treat the issues of cost reform 
and malpractice reform simultaneously, and leaves physicians 
in the untenable position that they may be liable for 
decisions that are beyond their control. 
225 
See Health Law, supra note 42,§ 9-5(d), at 356-58. 
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Private contracts instead of tort litigation could be 
used as a compensation system. Under this approach, 
providers would voluntarily contract with patients to cover 
certain outcomes, allocating between themselves the risks 
and responsibilities of treatment. Contracts allow for a 
great deal of flexibility, as the parties could agree in 
advance to issues such as the standard of care or liability, 
damage limitations, and alternative dispute mechanisms such 
as arbitration. Such proposals have been popular with 
libertarian academics, but effective contract law requires a 
degree of bargaining parity between the parties that 
227 
infrequently exists in the medical context. 
Under a no-fault liability system, all victims of 
iatrogenic injury would be eligible for compensation 
regardless of negligence. Proponents of this system argue 
2 2 8 
primarily for its superior compensation features. 
Courts have been very hostile in allowing the parties to waive tort 
liability via private contract, viewing this as against public policy. 
See Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 
1963) (the position of the California Supreme Court in Tunkl has been 
unanimously adopted by every state court which has addressed the issue). 
227 The same problems of contract law in products liability (e.g., 
information asymmetries, adhesion contracts) exist in the medical 
context. See supra notes 144-152 and accompanying text. For a more 
extensive discussion of contract law as a proposed reform model, see 
Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 93-113. 
228 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability 
and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 

90 
However, a no-fault system would almost certainly escalate 
claims and insurance costs. Even under the present system, 
the majority of claims that are filed are spurious. Thus, 
it is reasonable to assume that the number of claims filed 
under no-fault would rise dramatically since plaintiffs 
would only be required to show that an iatrogenic injury was 
suffered without also having to prove that it was 
negligently caused.230 
Although no-fault would relieve plaintiffs of the costs 
of proving negligence, there would still exist the 
administrative costs of proving causation. Patients 
presumably seek health care because they are already ill, 
and it would be extremely difficult and costly in many cases 
to determine whether an injury was the result of medical 
intervention or a natural progression of disease. 
With respect to injury prevention, no-fault may be as 
effective as enterprise liability in generating 
381 (1994); Jeffrey O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: 
Some Proposals, 59 Va. L. Rev. 749 (1973). 
229 See supra note 114 and accompany text. 
230 The total costs under a no-fault system could be much greater than 
under the present tort system. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Saying "No" to 
No-Fault: What the Harvard Malpractice Study Means for Medical 
Malpractice Reform, in N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Special Comm, on Medical 
Malpractice (Jan. 1991). 
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institutional safety incentives.231 However, it may actually 
weaken such incentives on the part of the individual 
physician. If patient compensation no longer turns on the 
issue of physician fault, the deterrent effect of a fault- 
based system may be compromised. Nevertheless, among the 
competing models of tort reform, no-fault deserves the most 
consideration as a serious alternative to enterprise 
liability. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGED CARE ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: 
CONCERNS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Over the past 20 years, medical malpractice has 
generated more state experimentation and interdisciplinary 
research than any other component of the civil justice 
system. Enterprise liability as a model of malpractice 
reform has yet to be implemented anywhere, despite having 
substantial legal and economic policy bases. Yet, without 
the lessons that would be gained from an actual experimental 
trial, the relative benefits and drawbacks of enterprise 
231 Because the institution would be responsible for all iatrogenic 
injury, it would have strong financial incentives to seek out sources of 
iatrogenic injury and minimize them through information gathering and 
management techniques. See Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial, supra 
note 7, at 144-50. 
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liability cannot be empirically assessed. The following are 
some of the transitional issues that would have to be 
addressed in order to determine the effectiveness of 
enterprise liability: 
• Methods_of_Implementation. Pursuant to the 
authority of an enabling statute, enterprise liability could 
be offered on an elective basis, or mandated, to a group of 
MCOs in a specified geographic region. Under either 
approach, all affiliated physicians, whether or not they 
were employees, would be immune from malpractice lawsuits. 
Physician liability would be retained, however, for any 
intentional torts committed. 
• Complementary_Insurance_Adjustments . Because 
physicians would no longer need to purchase independent 
malpractice insurance, there would need to be adjustments 
made to the system of insurance arrangements. First, 
affiliated physicians would pay an annual surcharge to 
reimburse the MCO for its increased insurance costs. 
232 An alternative to placing enterprise liability on MCO health plans 
would be to make hospitals the locus of enterprise liability. For a 
discussion of these two competing proposals, see Sage et al., supra note 
14, at 9-15; Abraham & Weiler, supra note 228, at 415-20. 
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However, this surcharge would be expected to be much less 
than the prior cost of individual insurance. Second, 
physician reimbursement schedules would have to be decreased 
because the overhead cost of individual malpractice 
insurance is incorporated into the physician's fees. 
• Complementary_Tort_Reform. Because enterprise 
liability replaces the physician with an impersonal, "deep- 
pocketed" defendant, this may encourage a sharp increase in 
the frequency and severity of claims. To enhance the 
compensation function of enterprise liability, it may be 
necessary to include some of the traditional tort reforms 
that many states have attempted. These would include 
damage limitations for nonpecuniary losses (e.g., pain and 
suffering), collateral source offset rules, and alternative 
means of dispute resolution.234 
In states still following the common law rules with respect to tort 
damages, forty to fifty percent of the compensation paid is for pain and 
suffering, the bulk of which is concentrated on the five percent of 
successful claimants with the most serious injuries (who represent 
perhaps two or three of every 1,000 victims of malpractice). Moreover, 
of the remaining compensation paid for strict economic losses, perhaps 
as much as sixty percent is already covered by public and private 
insurance programs (collateral sources). See Weiler, Medical 
Malpractice on Trial, supra note 7, at 48-54. 
234 • 
See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text. 
I 
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• Out~.QfNetwork Physicians. Many patients continue 
to receive medical care either from physicians not 
affiliated with any MCO, or under traditional fee-for- 
service arrangements (e.g., indemnity plans or Medicare). 
In these situations, managed care health plans would not be 
able to respond appropriately to the financial incentives 
created by enterprise liability, and physicians would have 
to maintain individual malpractice coverage for non-network 
patients. The benefits of a uniform legal rule would be 
diminished under these circumstances.235 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The current issues in health care reform require a 
comprehensive rethinking of the connections between the 
medical financing and delivery systems, and the civil 
justice system. In a time when physicians operated as 
autonomous independent contractors, a liability system of 
235 Enterprise liability has its greatest potential in situations where 
physicians are directly affiliated with one or a handful of competing 
health plans that are paid capitated premiums. Physicians with a 
multiplicity of affiliations would be less likely to develop allegiances 
to particular MCOs, and would be subject to confusing and potentially 
contradictory quality control procedures. The adoption of enterprise 
liability would force MCOs to adopt more careful selection criteria, and 
may encourage physicians to consolidate their affiliations. See Sage et 
al., supra note 14, at 24-25. 
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individual responsibility was appropriate. That time has 
since passed. Medicine is now delivered and financed 
through a system of integrated enterprises, and control over 
health resources is shared among an array of actors. Yet 
the liability system has to failed to evolve beyond its 
original design. 
The challenge before us now is to redesign a single 
liability system that will secure the optimal blend of these 
often-competing objectives: sensible and fair compensation, 
effective prevention of injury, promotion of quality care, 
and economical administration. The law is not a panacea for 
solving the numerous complex issues involved in health care, 
but it can play a significant role in aligning cost reform 
with our other normative goals. To maximize the 
contribution that tort law can make to this effort, 
malpractice liability should rest with the enterprise that 
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